Prolegomena

• What is theism?
  • Theism is the view that there is a personal God like that worshipped by Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

• What is a theistic argument?
  • Theistic arguments are arguments for (or the rationality of belief in or commitment to) the existence of a being with at least one God-like attribute, such as necessity, God-like power or knowledge, ground of morality, creator or designer of the natural world, and so on.

• COSMOLOGICALCosmological arguments seek to support belief that there is a cause, ground, or explanation of the cosmos or its constituents.

• Thomistic
  • First Way
    1. Some things are moved.
    2. Whatever is moved is moved by another.
    3. The series (ordered per se) of movers does not regress infinitely.
       ⓘAquinas accepts the possibility of an infinite series ordered per accidens, but thinks an infinite series ordered per se is problematic. In a former type of series, each member continues the series by actively passing on something it received to another, e.g., viral social media shares. In the latter, it is not up to each member in the series to continue the series, but rather each member passively passes on something it receives from an earlier member, e.g., falling Dominos.
    4. Therefore, there must be a first, unmoved mover.
    • Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2.3. SCG I, 13. John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University Press of America, 2000), pp. 444-459. Edward Feser, Aquinas (Oneworld, 2009), pp. 65-81. On the distinction between series ordered per accidens and per se, and problems with the latter, see Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," in Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, 1976), pp. 214-236. Caleb Cohoe, "There Must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Casual Series," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21/5 (2013), pp. 838-856.
  • Second Way
    1. Some things are caused.
    2. Whatever is caused is caused by another.
    3. The series (ordered per se) of causes does not regress infinitely.
       ⓘAquinas accepts the possibility of an infinite series ordered per accidens, but thinks an infinite series ordered per se is problematic. In a former type of series, each member continues the series by actively passing on something it received to another, e.g., viral social media shares. In the latter, it is not up to each member in the series to continue the series, but rather each member passively passes on something it receives from an earlier member, e.g., falling Dominos.
    4. Therefore, there must be an uncaused cause.
    • Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2.3. SCG I, 13. John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University Press of America, 2000), pp. 459-462. Edward Feser, Aquinas (Oneworld, 2009), pp. 81-90. On the distinction between series ordered per accidens and per se, and problems with the latter, see Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," in Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, 1976), pp. 214-236. Caleb Cohoe, "There Must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Casual Series," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21/5 (2013), pp. 838-856.
  • Third Way
    1. Whatever is contingent at one time did not exist.
    2. If everything is contingent, then at one time nothing existed.
       ⓘFor any contingent thing, there was a time when it did not exist. It follows that there was a time when nothing existed only if we assume that all contingent things form a whole which is contingent. Aquinas can then say at one time the whole—everything—did not exist; i.e., at one time nothing existed.
    3. If at one time nothing existed, then nothing would exist now.
       ⓘSomething cannot come from nothing. Nothing comes from nothing.
    4. Something does exist now.
    5. Therefore, not every being is contingent.
    6. Therefore, there is a necessary being.
    7. Either the necessary being gets its necessity from another, or exists necessarily of itself.
    8. The series (ordered per se) of necessary beings that get their necessity from another does not regress infinitely.
       ⓘAquinas accepts the possibility of an infinite series ordered per accidens, but thinks an infinite series ordered per se is problematic. In a former type of series, each member continues the series by actively passing on something it received to another, e.g., viral social media shares. In the latter, it is not up to each member in the series to continue the series, but rather each member passively passes on something it receives from an earlier member, e.g., falling Dominos.
    9. Therefore, there is a necessary being that exists necessarily of itself.
    • Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2.3. SCG I, 13. John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University Press of America, 2000), pp. 462-469. Edward Feser, Aquinas (Oneworld, 2009), pp. 90-99. On the distinction between series ordered per accidens and per se, and problems with the latter, see Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," in Kenny (ed.), Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame, 1976), pp. 214-236. Caleb Cohoe, "There Must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite, Essentially Ordered, Casual Series," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21/5 (2013), pp. 838-856.
  • Kalam
    • Craig
      1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
      2. The universe began to exist.
      3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
      • William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Wipf & Stock, 1979). Mark Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God, (Prometheus Books, 2007). William Lane Craig and James Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 3. Jabocus Erasmus, The Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment (Springer, 2018).
    • Loke
      1. There exists a series of causes-and-effects and
         changeschanges = events
         , and the number of earlier entities is either actually infinite or finite.
      2. If the number of earlier entities is finite, then either earlier and later entities are joined together like a loop such that there is no first member in the series, or the series has a first member i.e., a First Cause and a
         first changefirst change = first event
         .
      3. It is not the case that the number of earlier entities is actually infinite.
      4. It is not the case that earlier and later entities are joined together like a loop.
      5. Therefore, there exists a First Cause and a first change.
      6. Since the First Cause is the first, it must be uncaused.
      7. Since everything that begins to exist has a cause, the First Cause must be beginningless.
      8. Since the first change did not begin to exist uncaused, the first change must have been caused by a First Cause which was initially changeless.
      9. In order to cause the first event from an initial changeless state, the First Cause must
         
         1. The capacity to be the originator of the first event in a way that is undetermined by any prior event, since the First Cause is the first, and:
         2. The capacity to prevent itself from changing, for otherwise the First Cause would not have been initially changeless.
            ⓘ(9.1) and (9.2) imply that the First Cause has libertarian freedom.
      10. In order to bring about the entire universe, the First Cause must be enormously powerful.
      11. A First Cause that is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, has libertarian freedom, and enormously powerful is a Creator of the Universe.
      12. Therefore, a Creator of the universe exists.
      • Andrew Ter Ern Loke, God and Ultimate Origins (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Andrew Ter Ern Loke, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in Ruloff and Horban (eds.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), ch. 2.
    • Miller
      1. Pr(
         UU = The universe began to exist.
         |
         TT = Theism
         ) > Pr(U|~T).
      2. Therefore, Pr(T|U) > Pr(T).
      • Calum Miller, “A Bayesian Formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 50/4 (2014), pp. 521-534.
    • Pruss
      1. Something has a cause.
      2. There are no causal loops.
      3. Nothing has an infinite causal history.
         ⓘThis is causal finitism. Note that causal finitism is consistent with there being actual infinities.
      4. Therefore, there is an uncaused cause (1-3).
         ⓘSuppose x causes y, and that everything has a cause. So, x has a cause, w. Since (2) implies all causes are distinct, w must also have a cause, ad infinitum. I.e., y must have an infinite causal history,contra (3). QED.
      5. If there is an uncaused cause, God exists.
      6. Therefore, God exists.
      • Alexander Pruss, Infinity, Causation, and Paradox (Oxford, 2018). Alexander Pruss, “Paradoxes of Infinity and the First Cause,” in Rasmussen and Vallier (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists (Routledge, 2020), ch. 1.
    • Contingency
      • Leibniz
        1. Anything that exists has a sufficient reason for why it exists, either in another contingent being or in a necessary being. (PSR)
        2. The world exists.
        3. Therefore, the world has a sufficient reason for why it exists, either in another contingent being or in a necessary being. (1, 2)
        4. The sufficient reason for why the world exists cannot be in another contingent being, since (i) the world just is the collection of all contingent beings, and (ii) the sufficient reason for the collection cannot be in its parts, individually or collectively.
        5. Therefore, the sufficient reason for the world must be in an extramundane necessary being. (3, 4)
        6. Therefore, there is an extramundane necessary being.
        • G. W. Leibniz, “The Ultimate Origination of things”. G. W. Leibniz, “Monadology.” For defense of the PSR and its application to the universe, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006).
      • Davis
        1. Everything that exists has an explanation. (PSR)
        2. The universe exists.
        3. Therefore, the universe has an explanation. (1, 2)
        4. If the universe has an explanation, it is God.
           ⓘNote that this is equivalent to saying ‘If God does not exist, the universe has no explanation.’
        5. Therefore, God exists.
        • Stephen T. Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God,” Philosophia Christi 1/1 (1999), 5-16. For defense of the PSR and its application to the universe, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006).
      • Craig
        1. Everything that exists either exists by the necessity of its own nature or is explained by an external cause. (PSR)
        2. The universe does not exist by the necessity of its own nature.
        3. Therefore, the universe is explained by an external cause. (1, 2)
        4. If the universe is explained by an external cause, God exists.
           ⓘNote that this is equivalent to saying ‘If God does not exist, the universe is not explained by an external cause.’
        5. Therefore, God exists. (3, 4)
        • I have modified Craig’s formulation as presented in William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Crossway, 2008), pp. 106-111. For defense of the PSR and its application to the universe, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006).
      • Pruss
        1. Every contingent fact has an explanation. (PSR)
        2. There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
        3. Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
        4. This explanation cannot itself be a contingent fact.
        5. Therefore, the explanation of all contingent facts is necessary.
        • Alexander Pruss, “The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 2. For defense of the PSR, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006).
      • Koons
        • Koons (simplified)
          Mereological Axioms
          1. x is a
             part ofThe relation of ‘part of’ is reflexive and anti- symmetric
             y IFF anything that
             overlapsx overlaps y IFF x and y have a part in common
             x overlaps y.
          2. If there is a thing of type F, then there is an aggregate of all such types.
          3. x = y IFF x is a part of y and y is a part of x.
          4. If a whole exists, so do all of its parts.
          5. If all of the parts of a whole exist, so does thewhole.

          1. A wholly contingent thing is something thathas no necessary parts. (Def.)

          Principles of causation

          1. A cause and its effect must be distinct (i.e., a cause can’t overlap its effect).
          2. Every wholly contingent thing has a cause.

          The Argument

          1. All parts of a necessary thing are necessary.(A4, modal system K)
             ⓘThe characteristic axiom of K is the distribution rule: □(p → q) → (□p → □q)
          2. Every contingent thing has a wholly contingent part. (A1, A2)
          3. Let ‘the universe’ be the aggregate of all wholly contingent things. (Def.)
          4. If there are any contingent things, the universe is a wholly contingent thing. (A1, A3, A5, D, L1)
          5. If there are any contingent things, the universe has a cause. (L3, C2)
          6. Every contingent thing overlaps the universe. (L2, A2, U)

          1. If there are any contingent things, then the universe has a cause that is a necessary thing. (L4, C1, L5, A1)
          • Robert Koons, “A New Look at the Cosmological Argument,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34/2 (1997), pp. 193-211. For a similar argument, see John O’Leary Hawthorne and Andrew Cortens, “The Principle of Necessary Reason,” Faith and Philosophy 10/1 (1993), pp. 60-67.
        • Koons (simplified again)
          1. There are contingent things. (P)
          2. The aggregate of all wholly contingent things is a wholly contingent thing.
             ⓘThis is derived from the axioms of mereology.
          3. The universe is the aggregate of all wholly contingent things. (Def.)
          4. Therefore, the universe is a wholly contingent thing. (2, 3)
          5. Every wholly contingent thing has a cause. (P)
             ⓘThis is the main premise of the argument. Koons: “The evidence for (5) is essentially empirical. Every success of common sense and science in reconstructing the causal antecedents of particular events and classes of events provides confirmation of (5).”
          6. Therefore, the universe has a cause that is not a contingent thing. (4, 5)
             ⓘThe ‘that is not a contingent thing’ follows from the axioms of mereology and principles of causation (A1 and C1).
          • Robert Koons, “A New Look at the Cosmological Argument,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34/2 (1997), pp. 193-211. For a similar argument, see John O’Leary Hawthorne and Andrew Cortens, “The Principle of Necessary Reason,” Faith and Philosophy 10/1 (1993), pp. 60-67.
      • Pruss & Rasmussen
        1. For any particular
           concrete thingsA concrete thing is something that possibly causes something.
           , there is an explanation of the fact that those things exist. (PSR)
        2. Considering all the concrete things that exist, if there is an explanation of the fact that those things exist, then there is a necessary concrete being.
        3. Therefore, there is a necessary concrete thing.
        • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), ch. 3. For defense of the PSR, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge, 2006).
      • Modal
        • Anselm
          1. For any kind of thing, if there is not, but possibly could be, something of that kind, then it is possible for something of that kind to be caused.
          2. There could possibly be something divine.
          3. It is not possible for anything divine to be caused.
          4. Therefore, something divine exists.
          • Anselm, Reply to Guanilo, I. A. D. Smith, Anselm’s Other Argument (Harvard, 2014).
        • Scotus
          1. Whatever cannot possibly exist from something else possibly exists from itself.
          2. It’s possible that a
             first causal potencyBy ‘first causal potency’ it is meant a first cause, but not necessarily one that exercises its causal power.
             exist.
          3. The first causal potency cannot possibly exist from something else.
          4. Therefore, it’s possible that a first causal potency exists from itself. (1-3)
          5. What is nonexistent cannot bring anything into existence.
          6. Even if (per impossible) what is nonexistent could bring itself into existence, it would not be altogether uncausable.
          7. Therefore, it is not possible for something to exist from itself which does not actually exist from itself.
          8. Therefore, a first causal potency does exist from itself.
          • Scotus, Tractatus De Primo Principio 3.1-19. Timothy O’Connor, “Scotus on the Existence of a First Efficient Cause,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 33 (1993), pp. 17-32.
        • Ross
          1. It is impossible that anything prevent the existence of God.
          2. For any individual x, if it is a fact that x exists or a fact that x does not exist, it is possible that there is an explanation for the fact that x exists or the fact that x does not exist.
             ⓘThis is a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
          3. God does not exist.
             ⓘSuppose for reductio.
          4. It is possible that there is an explanation for the fact that God does not exist. (1, 2)
          5. It is not possible that there is an explanation for the fact that God does not exist.
             ⓘThis is argued to follow from (1).
          6. It is and is not possible that there is an explanation for the fact that God does not exist. (4, 5, contradiction)
          7. It is false that God does not exist. (3-6)
          • James F. Ross, Philosophical Theology (Bobbs- Merrill, 1969), pp. 173-181. Outline borrowed from Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 203-205.
        • Leftow
          1. The fact that there exist just the changeable things that do exist (henceforward, the fact that C) obtains.
          2. C is possibly
             d-explained.Dependence explanation: x d-explains y IFF (i) y is actual, (ii) x is an actual concrete substance and x ≠ y, (iii) some activity of x entails y exists, (iv) necessarily, x’s existence or activity at least partially explains y’s actuality, (v) the relation between x and y is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
          3. For all actual x, if x is possibly d-explained, x is actually d-explained.
          4. If C is possibly d-explained, C is actually d-explained. (3)
          5. C is d-explained. (2, 4)
          6. For all y, if y is d-explained, there exists some x which d-explained y. (clause (ii) of
             d-explanationDependence explanation: x d-explains y IFF (i) y is actual, (ii) x is an actual concrete substance and x ≠ y, (iii) some activity of x entails y exists, (iv) necessarily, x’s existence or activity at least partially explains y’s actuality, (v) the relation between x and y is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
             )
          7. If C is d-explained, there exists some x which d-explained C. (6)
          8. There exists some x which d-explains C. (5, 7)
          9. If anything d-explains C, that thing is not itself changeable. (clause (v) of
             d-explanationDependence explanation: x d-explains y IFF (i) y is actual, (ii) x is an actual concrete substance and x ≠ y, (iii) some activity of x entails y exists, (iv) necessarily, x’s existence or activity at least partially explains y’s actuality, (v) the relation between x and y is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
             )
          10. There exists something which d-explains C and is not changeable. (8, 9)
          • Brian Leftow, “A Modal Cosmological Argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24/3 (1988), pp. 159-188.
        • Katz & Kremer
          1. Given that (i) there is a possible explanation of the fact that F and (ii) any possible explanation of the fact that F entails P, it is reasonable to believe P.
             ⓘEpistemic Principle of Possible Explanations. E.g., The match is on fire. Any possible explanation of that fact entails there’s oxygen in the atmosphere. So, it’s reasonable to believe there’s oxygen in the atmosphere.

          1. The proposition that there is a unique necessary being who brought about the existence of everything other than itself by willing that the other beings should exist, would, if true, explain why there are contingent beings.
          2. There is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings.
             ⓘ(1) and (2) together satisfy (PPE): Given that (i) there is a possible explanation of the fact that F[there are contingent beings] and (ii) any possible explanation of the fact that F[there are contingent beings] entails P[there is a necessary being], it is reasonable to believe that P[there is a necessary being].
          3. There is no proposition consistent with the claim that there are only contingent beings which, if true, would explain why there are contingent beings.
             ⓘYou can’t explain a generalization by appeal to an instance of that generalization. E.g., to fully answer “Why are there Tigers?” you will eventually have to appeal to a non-Tiger.
          4. Any possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings entails that there is a necessary being.
          5. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.
          • Bernard Katz and Elmar Kremer, “The Cosmological Argument Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason,” Faith and Philosophy 14/1 (1997), pp. 62- 70.
        • Gale & Pruss
          1. For any proposition p, if p is true, then possibly, there is a proposition q that explains p.
          2. All the contingently true propositions in the actual world form a big conjunctive proposition, BCCP.
          3. Possibly, there is a proposition q that explains BCCP. (1, 2)
          4. q explains BCCP only if q involves a necessary being.
             ⓘBecause if q were contingent, q would be in BCCP. So, q can’t be contingent, but necessary.
          5. There is a proposition q that explains BCCP that involves a necessary being. (3, 4, S5)
             ⓘIf [possibly, q explains p, and q explains p only if q is necessary], then [possibly, q is necessary]. In modal system S5, whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.
          6. q explains BCCP only if q reports a personal explanation.
             ⓘThere are two kinds of explanations: scientific and personal. Scientific explanations are just generalizations over contingent reality, so are themselves contingent propositions in BCCP. So q must report a personal explanation.
          7. Therefore, there is a proposition q that explains BCCP that involves a necessary being and reports a personal explanation. (5, 6)
          • Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, “A New Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 35/4 (1999), pp. 461-476. Gale and Pruss speak of a Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, or BCCF. I replace “Fact” with “Proposition” for ease of exposition.
        • Rasmussen & Turri
          1. It is possible that the first contingent thing to exist is caused to exist.
          2. It is possible that the first contingent thing is caused to exist only if a necessary being caused it to exist.
             ⓘIf the first contingent thing is caused to exist, something other than a contingent thing with causal power caused it to exist. So, it must be a necessary being with causal power.
          3. Therefore, a necessary being with causal power possibly exists. (1, 2)
          4. If a necessary being with causal power possibly exists, it exists. (S5)
             ⓘIn modal system S5, whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.
          5. Therefore, there is a necessary being with causal power. (3, 4)
          • Joshua Rasmussen, “A New Argument for a Necessary Being,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2 (2011), pp. 351-356. John Turri, “A New and Improved Argument for a Necessary Being,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2 (2011), pp. 357-359.
        • Rasmussen & Weaver
          1. It is possible that there is a
             purely contingent totality eventAn event is purely contingent IFF it includes only contingent substances or fusions thereof, and a purely contingent totality event is a purely contingent event that includes all contingent substances.
             that has a cause.
          2. It is impossible that a cause of a purely contingent totality event is purely contingent.
             ⓘA cause cannot be identical to or included within its effect.
          3. If (1) and (2), then it is possible that there is a cause that isn’t purely contingent.
             ⓘThe inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is:

             1. Possibly, there is an F.
             2. Necessarily, no F is a G.
             3. Therefore, possibly, there is an F that is not a G.
          4. If (3), then there is a necessary thing that can be a cause.
             ⓘFrom (3) to (4) by S5. If a purely contingent event possibly has a cause, the world in which it does have a cause, that cause must be necessary. What is possibly necessary is necessary.
          5. Therefore, there is a necessary thing that can be a cause.
          • Joshua Rasmussen and Christopher Weaver, “Why is There Anything at All?” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 137-156. See also Joshua Rasmussen, “From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being,” Philosophical Studies 148/2 (2010), pp. 183- 200. Christopher Weaver, “Yet Another New Cosmological Argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (2016), pp. 11-31.
        • Pruss & Rasmussen I
          1. For any positive state of affairs that can
             begin to obtainA state of affairs begins to obtain IFF its obtaining is restricted to a finite interval of time in the past direction.
             , it is possible for there to be something
             externalAn external cause is one that can exist without its effect.
             to it that causes it to obtain.
          2. It is possible for there to be a beginning of the positive state of affairs of its being the case that there exist contingent concrete things.
          3. If (1) and (2) are true, then it is possible that there is a necessary concrete thing.
          4. Therefore, it is possible that there is a necessary concrete thing.
          5. If it is possible that there is a necessary concrete thing, then there is a necessary concrete thing.
             ⓘIn modal system S5, whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.
          6. Therefore, there is a necessary concrete thing.
          • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), ch. 4. See also Joshua Rasmussen, “From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being,” Philosophical Studies 148/2 (2010), pp. 183-200.
        • Pruss & Rasmussen II
          1. Normally, for any property P, if (i) P can
             begin to be exemplifiedA property begins to be exemplified IFF its exemplification is restricted to a finite interval of time in the past direction.
             , (ii) P can have instances that have a cause, (iii) P is
             basica basic property is one that can be grasped without thereby grasping other properties or relations. E.g., existence, truth, goodness, beauty.
             or a
             determinateE.g., a determinate of the basic property existence is contingent existence.
             of a basic property, and (iv) there is a determinate of P that can be
             caused to be exemplifiedif x causes a property to be exemplified, then x can exist without exemplifying the very property it causes to be exemplified.
             , then there can be a cause of P’s being exemplified.
             ⓘThis is a precise formulation of the rough idea that any property that can begin to be exemplified can be caused to be exemplified.
          2. There is property C, such that C = being contingent.
          3. C can begin to be exemplified.
          4. C can have instances that have a cause.
          5. C is basic or a determinate of a basic property.
          6. There is a determinate of C that can be caused to be exemplified.
          7. Therefore, there can be a cause of the exemplification of C.
          8. If there can be a cause of the exemplification of C, then there is a necessary concrete thing.
             ⓘWhatever can be a cause is concrete, and since whatever can be the cause of C can fail to be an instance of C (i.e., contingent), it can be necessary. In modal system S5, what can be a necessary is necessary. Thus, there can be a necessary concrete cause of C. So, there is.
          9. Therefore, there is a necessary concrete thing.
          • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), ch. 5. See also Joshua Rasmussen, “A New Argument for a Necessary Being,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2 (2011), pp. 351-356.
        • Other
          • Descartes
            • Descartes (scholasticese)
              1. There must be in the cause of an idea at least as much
                 formal realityFor an object of an idea, the formal reality is the object’s actual, extra-mental reality.
                 as the idea contains
                 objective realityThe objective reality of an idea is the idea as it is represented in the mind.
                 .
                 ⓘAn idea is like a picture. The objective reality is the picture itself, the formal reality is what the picture is of. The formal reality of the picture is more real than its objective reality, and its objective reality can never be as great or perfect as the thing itself. Premise (1) is supposed to be an instance of the more general principle that effects can only be less or as real as their causes. E.g., Arthur Doyle, as the cause of Sherlock Holmes, is more real than Sherlock Holmes, but as the cause of his son, Kingsley, is just as real as his son. But neither Sherlock nor Kingsley can be more real than Arthur Doyle.
              2. I have the idea of God.
              3. My idea of God is the effect of some cause.
              4. The idea of God has infinite objective reality.
              5. Therefore, the idea of God has a cause with infinite formal reality.
              6. No finite substance (e.g., myself) can be the cause of my idea of God.
              7. Only an infinite substance can be the cause of my idea of God.
              8. Therefore, God exists.
              • Descartes, Meditation III. Robert Delahunty, “Descartes’ Cosmological Argument,” The Philosophical Quarterly 30/118 (1980), pp. 34-46. Lawrence Nolan, “The Third Meditation: Causal Arguments for God’s Existence,” in Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditation (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 127-148.
            • Descartes (simplified)
              1. I have the idea of an infinite, perfect being.
              2. Ideas are caused either by other ideas or by the extra-mental realities the ideas are of.
              3. My idea of an infinite, perfect being cannot have been caused by other ideas.
                 ⓘThe idea of an infinite, perfect being is totally unique and could not have been assembled from other ideas, because all of our other ideas are of finite, imperfect things.
              4. Therefore, my idea of an infinite, perfect being is caused by the extra-mental reality it is an idea of.
              5. Therefore, an infinite, perfect being exists.
              • Descartes, Meditation III. Robert Delahunty, “Descartes’ Cosmological Argument,” The Philosophical Quarterly 30/118 (1980), pp. 34-46. Lawrence Nolan, “The Third Meditation: Causal Arguments for God’s Existence,” in Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditation (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 127-148.
          • Clarke
            1. There are dependent beings.
            2. For any dependent being, it either depends on itself, or it depends on another.
            3. Nothing can depend on itself.
            4. Therefore, all dependent beings depend on another. (1, 2)
            5. The series of beings which depend on another can’t be infinite.
            6. If the series of beings which depend on another can’t be infinite, then the series of beings which depend on another must ultimately depend on an independent being.
            7. The series of beings which depend on another must ultimately depend on an independent being. (5, 6)
            8. Therefore, there is an independent being.
            • Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Good discussion of Clarke is William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, 1975) and Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 244ff. Bruce Reichenbach defends a similar argument in The Cosmological argument: A Reassessment (Charles C. Thomas, 1972) and, more recently, in Soufiane Hamri’s “On the Ultimate Ground of Being,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83/2 (2018), pp. 161-168 and “The Modal Symmetry First Cause Argument,” Religious Studies 55/1 (2019), pp. 77-84.
          • Bolzano
            1. Some things are
               conditionedA thing is conditioned if it depends in some way, any way, on something else for its existence.
               .
            2. Whatever is conditioned presupposes the existence of something else that conditions it.
            3. The class of all conditioned things is itself conditioned.
            4. Whatever conditions the class of all conditioned things cannot itself be a conditioned thing.
            5. Therefore, there is an
               unconditionedAn unconditioned thing depends in no way on anything for its existence.
               thing.
            • Bolzano, Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft. Discussed in Peter Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford, 1987), pp. 321-323.
          • Meyer
            1. If D is a
               directed setA set D under partial order R is directed IFF for any two elements J and K in D, there exists an item I that is a lower bound for both J and K.
               under a
               partial orderA relation R is a partial order if it is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
               R, and every chain C in D has a lower bound under R, then there is exactly one minimal element E in D under R.
               ⓘThis is an instance of the Axiom of Choice.

            1. There is a directed set S of all things under partial order A, the relation of
               causal anteriorityx is causally anterior to y IFF x is the efficient cause of y and x ≠ y.
               .
            2. Every chain c in S has a lower bound under A.
            3. Therefore, there is exactly one minimal element G in S under A, and G is causally anterior to every element in S. (AOC, 1, 2)
            • Robert K. Meyer, “God Exists!” Nous 21/3 (1987), pp. 345-361. Alexander Pruss, “Meyer’s (or Putnam’s) Proof of the Existence of God.” My own outline owes much to Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 123-125.
          • Swinburne
            1. The universe exists and is a certain way: (i) it is complex, yet everything behaves in an orderly, lawlike way. (ii) It is such as to be a suitable theater for humans and animals to evolve. (iii) Humans evolved so as to be able to have true beliefs about the world, and meaningfully act in it.
            2. If theism can explain why the universe exists and is this way better than naturalism, that the universe exists and is the way it is makes theism more likely than naturalism.
               ⓘNaturalism cannot explain why the universe exists and is the way it is because it has only scientific explanations available, but the universe existing and being the way it is is a precondition of scientific explanation. Theism can explain this by appealing to the intentions of a free agent, namely, God.
            3. Theism can explain why the universe exists and is this way better than naturalism.
            4. Therefore, that the universe exists and is the way it is makes theism more likely than naturalism.
            • Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 2004), ch. 7.
          • Rutten
            1. There are objects.
            2. Every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects.
            3. Every object is caused or is the cause of another object.
            4. The cause of an object is disjoint with that object.
            5. The sum of all caused simple objects is an object.
            6. Every caused composite object contains a caused proper part.
            7. There is a first cause.
            • Emanuel Rutten, Towards a Renewed Case for Theism (Wöhrmann, 2012), ch. 6.
          • Deng
            1. Every non-fundamental entity is ultimately grounded in some fundamental entities.
            2. All else being equal, a theory postulating fewer fundamental entities is better than a theory postulating more fundamental entities.
            3. The best theory is one that postulates one entity that ultimately grounds everything else.
            4. If our best theory says p, we are justified in believing p.
            5. Therefore, we are justified in believing there one entity that ultimately grounds everything else.
            • Duen-Min Deng, “A New Cosmological Argument from Grounding,” Analysis 80/3 (2019), pp. 418-426.
          • Nobody
            1. Everything has a cause.
               ⓘSome theists do argue that everything has an explanation or ground, but none argues that everything has an efficient cause, since that’s obviously susceptible to the simple retort “Then what caused God?” The beloved straw man may owe its endurance in part to the fact that the word ‘cause’ did not always have the narrow meaning it does today.
            2. If everything has a cause, then the universe has a cause.
            3. Therefore, the universe has a cause and is God.
            • Nobody Ever. “The Straw Man that Will Not Die” (Freethunk Press).

• ONTOLOGICALOntological arguments seek to demonstrate the existence of God based on the very idea or concept of God.

• Anselm, Proslogion II
  • Proslogion II (reductio)
    1. GodGod is a being than which no greater can be conceived.
       exists in the understanding but not in reality.
       ⓘAssumption for reductio.
    2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.
    3. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived.
    4. A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (1, 2)
    5. A being greater than God can be conceived. (3, 4)
    6. It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (Def. of “God”)
    7. Therefore, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (1, 5, 6)
    8. Therefore, God exists in reality.
    • Anselm, Proslogion II. Robert Adams, “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Arguments,” The Philosophical Review 80/1 (1971), pp. 28-54. Brian Davies, “Anselm and the Ontological Argument.” In Davies & Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 157-178.
  • Proslogion II (simplified)
    1. A being than which no greater can be conceived exists at least in the mind.
    2. It is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind.
    3. Therefore, a being than which no greater can be conceived exists not only in the mind but also in reality.
    4. Therefore, God exists in reality.
    • Anselm, Proslogion II. Robert Adams, “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Arguments,” The Philosophical Review 80/1 (1971), pp. 28-54. Brian Davies, “Anselm and the Ontological Argument.” In Davies & Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 157-178.
  • Anselm, Proslogion III
    • Hartshorne’s Formulation
      1. If a perfect being exists, it exists necessarily.
      2. Either a perfect being exists necessarily or not.
      3. If not, then necessarily, a perfect being does not exist necessarily.
         ⓘBecker’s postulate: modal status is always necessary
      4. Therefore, either a perfect being exists necessarily or necessarily, a perfect being does not exist necessarily. (2, 3)
      5. If, necessarily, a perfect being does not exist necessarily, then necessarily, a perfect being does not exist. (1, 3)
      6. Either a perfect being exists necessarily or necessarily, a perfect being does not exist. (4, 5)
      7. It’s not the case that necessarily, a perfect being does not exist.
         ⓘI.e., it’s possible that a perfect being exists.
      8. A perfect being exists necessarily. (6, 7)
      • Anselm, Proslogion III. Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (Open Court, 1962).
    • Malcolm’s Formulation
      1. Either God’s existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
      2. If God’s existence is logically impossible, the concept of God is contradictory.
      3. The concept of God is not contradictory.
      4. Therefore, God’s existence is logically necessary.
      • Anselm, Proslogion III. Norman Malcolm, “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments,” The Philosophical Review 69/1 (1960), pp. 41-62.
    • Descartes
      1. If I cannot conceive of x without y, then y belongs to the nature of x.
      2. I cannot conceive of a supremely perfect being without existence.
      3. Therefore, existence belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect being. (1, 2)
      4. If existence belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect being, then a supremely perfect being exists.
      5. A supremely perfect being exists. (3, 4)
      • Descartes, Meditation V. Lawrence Nolan, “Descartes.” In Oppy (Ed.), Ontological Arguments (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 53-74. Lawrence Nolan, “Descartes’ Ontological Argument,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020).
    • Plantinga
      1. It is possible that a
         maximally great beingA being is maximally great IFF it is maximally excellent in all possible worlds. A being is maximally excellent if it is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.
         exists.
      2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).
      3. Therefore, a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).
      • Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974).
    • Kearns
      1. It is possible that God exists.
      2. If it is possible that God exists, there is something that grounds the fact that it is possible that God exists.
         ⓘBy the principle that if it is possible that there is an F, there is something that grounds the possibility that there is an F. Why think this is true? It’s plausible to think of possibility claims as less fundamental than claims about actuality – that what possibly exists is built from what in fact exists.
      3. Only God, if anything, grounds the fact that it is possible that God exists.
         ⓘThe idea is that whatever grounds the possibility of something is at least as fundamental as the possibility of that thing. But God is the most fundamental being. So, anything that’s as fundamental as God would just be God.
      4. Therefore, God exists.
      • Stephen Kearns, “A modified Meditation: exploring a grounding modal ontological argument," Religious Studies 58/4 (2021), pp. 801-813.
    • Hausmann
      1. Possibly, God exists. (Premise)
      2. Necessarily, if God exists, it is
         actuallyThe standard logic of ‘actually’:
         (PL) If ϕ is a tautology, then ⊢ ϕ.
         (MP) If ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ → ψ then ⊢ ψ.
         (Def-◇) ⊢ ◇ϕ ↔ ~☐~ϕ.
         (K) ⊢☐(ϕ → ψ) → (☐ϕ → ☐ψ).
         (@K) ⊢ @(ϕ → ψ) → (@ϕ → @ψ).
         (@D) ⊢ @ ϕ ↔ ~@~ϕ.
         (☐@) ⊢ @ ϕ → ☐@ϕ.
         (@T) ⊢ ϕ → @ϕ.
         (RN) If ⊢ ϕ then ⊢ ☐ϕ, if ϕ is provable without any instance of (@T).
         (Lemma 1) ◇@ϕ → @ϕ.
         (Lemma 2) @ϕ → ϕ.]
         true that God exists. (Premise)
         ⓘPremise (2) can be defended without the assumption that necessary existence belongs to the concept of God by assuming instead that it belongs to the concept of God that nothing can exist without God. Thus, given that something exists at the actual world, it is part of the concept of God that God exists at the actual world. It follows that, even if there are worlds at which God does not exist, God would still have to exist at the actual world. This permits formulations of the MOA without B and S5.
      3. Therefore, if possibly, God exists, then possibly, it is actually true that God exists. (2, RN, K)
      4. Therefore, possibly, it is actually true that God exists. (1, 3)
      5. Therefore, it is actually true that God exists. (4, L1)
      6. Therefore, God exists. (5, L2)
      • Marco Hausmann, “The Actual Challenge for the Ontological Argument,” Analysis 82/2 (2022), pp. 222-230.
    • The Generic MOA
      1. Either it’s necessary that God exists or it’s not possible that God exists. (Def.).
      2. Possibly, God exists. (Premise)
      3. Therefore, God exists.
         ⓘIf part of what it means to be God is to exist necessarily (i.e., God’s existence is either necessary or impossible), the modal ontological argument boils down to a single premise: Possibly, God exists. This is because the possible existence of a being whose existence is either necessary or impossible entails its actual existence in all non-trivial modal systems (T, B, S4, S5).
      • Proof in T & S4
        • 
      • Proof in B
        • 
      • Proof in S5
        • 
    • Possibility Proofs
      • Gödel
        1. If P is positive, then ~P is not positive.
        2. If P is positive and P entails Q, then Q is positive.
        3. If P is positive, then necessarily P is positive.
        4. The property of being
           God-Likex is God-like IFF x has all and only positive properties as essential properties
           is positive.
        5. The property of necessary existence is positive.
        6. Therefore, there is a God-like being. (1-5)
           ⓘ(1) and (2) entail any pair of positive properties is compossible (two properties are compossible if something can have both). Proof: if P and Q are positive but not compossible, then whatever has Q cannot have P. So, Q entails ~P. By (2), ~P is positive, contra (1). QED. A God-like being must have necessary existence (Def. of God-like, 5). God-likeness and necessary existence are compossible (3-5). What is possibly necessary is necessary, and so actual (modal systems B, S5). Therefore, (6).
        • C. Anthony Anderson, “Some Emendations on Gödel’s Ontological Proof,” Faith and Philosophy 7/3 (1990), pp. 291-303. Alexander Pruss, “Gödel,” in Oppy (ed.), Ontological Arguments (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 139-154. I have made slight modifications and simplifications.
      • Maydole
        1. A property is a
           perfectionA property is a perfection only if it is necessarily better to have than not.
           only if its negation is not.
        2. Perfections entail only perfections.
        3. The property of
           being supremex is a supreme being IFF necessarily, x is greater than all other beings. More formally: x has the property of being S IFF it is impossible for something to be greater and impossible for there to be something else than which it is not greater. Symbolized:
           Def. “Sx”: ~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy))
           is a perfection.
        4. Therefore, it is possible that a supreme being exists. (1-3)
        5. If it is possible that a supreme being exists, a supreme being exists.
        6. Therefore, a supreme being exists.
        • Proof of (4)
          1. ~◇(∃y)Sy. [AIP]
          2. ~◇(∃y)Sy → □(∀x)(Sx → ~Sx). [theorem]
          3. □(∀x)(Sx → ~Sx). [4.1, 4.2 MP]
          4. □(∀x)(ŷ[~Sy]x ↔ ~Sy). [Principle of Abstraction, Necessity Introduction]
          5. (□(∀x)(Sx → ~Sx) ∧ □(∀x)(ŷ[~Sy]x ↔ ~Sx)) → □(∀x)(Sx → ŷ[~Sy]x). [theorem]
          6. □(∀x)(Sx → ŷ[~Sy]x). [4.3, 4.4, 4.5, Conj, MP]
          7. P(S). [3]
          8. (P(S) ∧ □(∀x)(Sx → ŷ[~Sy]x)) → Pŷ[~Sy]). [2, UI)
          9. Pŷ[~Sy]. [4.6, 4.7, 4.8, Conj, MP]
          10. P(S) → ~P(ŷ[~Sy]). [1, UI]
          11. ~P(ŷ[~Sy]). [4.9, 4.10 MP]
          12. ◇(∃y)Sy. [4.1-4.11 IP]
        • Proof of (5)
          1. ◇(∃x)Sx. [premise]
          2. ◇(∃x)Sx → (∃x)◇Sx. [theorem]
             ⓘThe Barcan Formula: If possibly there is something that is F, then there is something that is possibly F.
          3. (∃x)◇Sx. [5.1, 5.2 MP]
          4. ◇Sv. [3, EI]
          5. ◇(~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy)). [5.4, Def. “S”]
          6. ◇(~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy)) → (◇~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ◇~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy)). [theorem]
          7. (◇~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ◇~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy)). [5.4, 5.5 MP]
          8. ◇~◇(∃y)Gyv. [7 Simp]
          9. ◇~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy). [5.7, Com, Simp]
          10. ◇~◇(∃y)Gyv → ~◇(∃y)Gyv. [theorem]
          11. ◇~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy) → ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy). [theorem]
          12. ~◇(∃y)Gyv. [5.8, 5.10 MP]
          13. ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy). [5.9, 5.11 MP]
          14. ~◇(∃y)Gyv ∧ ~◇(∃y)(v≠y ∧ ~Gvy). [5.12, 5.13 Conj]
          15. Sv. [14, Def. “S”]
          16. (∃x)Sx. [5.15 EG]
        • • Robert Maydole, “Ontological Arguments,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), pp. 580ff.
      • Bernstein
        1. It is impossible that something has all
           perfectionsA property is a perfection if it in no way detracts from a being’s greatness, but its complement does.
           .
           ⓘAssume for reductio.
        2. If it is impossible that something has all perfections, then there is a perfection that is sufficient for not having some other perfection (namely, the one with which it is inconsistent).
        3. If a property is sufficient for not having some perfection, then that property is sufficient for being imperfect.
        4. If a property is sufficient for being imperfect, then it is not a perfection.
        5. There is some perfection that is sufficient for not having some perfection. (1, 2)
        6. There is some perfection that is sufficient for being imperfect. (3, 5)
        7. There is some perfection that is not a perfection. (4, 6 contradiction)
        8. Possibly, something has all perfections.
           ⓘHaving established the possibility of something with all perfections, and assuming necessity is a perfection, it follows that something does have all perfections.
        • C’Zar Bernstein, “Is God’s Existence Possible?” Heythrop Journal 59/3 (2018), pp. 424-432. “Giving the Ontological Argument its Due,” Philosophia 42/3 (2014), pp. 665-679.
      • Pruss & Rasmussen
        1. If P is
           positivePruss & Rasmussen offer several ways of understanding “positive” that works with the argument. Where to be negative is to detract from excellence,
           

           1. P is positive IFF P is not negative.
           2. P is positive IFF ~P is negative.
           3. P is positive IFF P is not negative and ~P is negative.
           4. P is positive IFF P is entailed by a property that is atomic (simple).

           Axioms (1) and (2) must be modified accordingly.
           , then ~P is not positive.
        2. If P is positive and P entails Q, then Q is positive.
        3. If P and Q are positive, then P&Q is possible. (1, 2)
           ⓘSuppose for reductio P&Q is impossible, i.e., whatever has P cannot have Q. So, P entails ~Q. By (2), ~Q is positive. But by (1), Q cannot be positive. Contradiction. So, P&Q is not impossible.
        4. Existing necessarily is positive.
        5. Possibly causing something is positive.
        6. Therefore, there is a necessarily existing entity that possibly causes something. (3-5)
           ⓘWhat is possibly necessary is necessary, and so actual (modal systems B, S5). Therefore, (6).
        • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), ch. 8.
      • Possibility Defenses
        • Kordig & Vallicella
          1. If x ought to exist, x possibly exists.
             ⓘThis is a modalized version of the axiarchic principle that if x ought to exist, x exists. ‘Ought’ here is not moral, exactly, at least in the sense of moral acts of agents. Rather, some states of affairs ought to be and ought not be, just due to their value or disvalue. But in its modal form, the axiarchic principle is the metaphysical counterpart of the ethical principle that if S ought to do a, S can do a.
          2. God ought to exist.
             ⓘWhatever is maximally perfect is deontically perfect. What is deontically perfect ought to exist. God is maximally perfect. So, God is deontically perfect. So, God ought to exist.
          3. Therefore, God possibly exists.
          4. If God possibly exists, God exists.
             ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See The Generic MOA.
          5. Therefore, God exists.
          • Carl Kordig, “A Deontic Argument for God’s Existence,” Nous 15/2 (1981), pp. 207-208. William Vallicella, “Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?” in Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs (De Gruyter, 2018), pp. 205–212. Further defense of the axiarchic principle can be found in John Leslie’s work, e.g., his Value and Existence (Blackwell, 1979).
        • Pruss I
          1. Mystics have experiences in which it seems to them God exists.
          2. If mystics have experiences in which it seems to them God exists, we should presume God possibly exists
             ⓘIndian philosopher Śaṃkara said impossible things do not appear in any way. In positive form: Śaṃkara’s Principle: if it seems to S that p, we should presume p is possible. E.g., what seems real to you during an hallucination is not reason to think it is real, but is reason to think its possible.
          3. If we should presume God possibly exists, we should presume God exists.
             ⓘBecause the possible existence of God entails the actual existence of God. See The Generic MOA.
          4. Therefore, we should presume God exists.
          • Alexander Pruss, “Śamkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001), pp. 111-120.
        • Pruss II
          1. If x is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives, that is evidence that x can exist.
          2. God is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives.
          3. Therefore, that is evidence that God can exist.
          4. Evidence that God can exist is evidence that God does exist.
             ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See The Generic MOA.
          5. Therefore, that God is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives is evidence that God exists
          • Alexander Pruss, “The Ontological Argument and the Motivational Centers of Lives,” Religious Studies 46/2 (2010), pp. 233-249
        • Nagasawa
          1. It is a possible that a
             real maximally great beingA real maximally great being is a being that has real maximal excellence in all possible worlds. A being has real maximal excellence if it has the maximal degree of knowledge, power, and goodness that is mutually consistent.
             exists.
             ⓘNagasawa argues that the whole debate about God’s possible existence can be avoided by simply defining God as the being with the maximal degree of knowledge, power, and goodness that is mutually consistent. Whatever conception of those attributes meets that extremity, their co-instantiation is now possible by definition.
          2. If it is a possible that a real maximally great being exists, a real maximally great being exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).
          3. Therefore, a real maximally great being exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).
          • Yujin Nagasawa, Maximal God (Oxford, 2017).
        • Rasmussen
          1. Some degree of value can be instantiated.
          2. If some degree of value can be instantiated, then each degree of value can be instantiated.
             ⓘBased on the principle of modal continuity: all instances of degreed properties are possible or impossible—differences in degree are irrelevant to whether they can be instantiated.
          3. Therefore, each degree of value can be instantiated.
          4. Maximal greatnessTo be maximally great is to be omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and necessarily existent.
             is a degree of value.
          5. Therefore, maximal greatness can be instantiated.
          6. If maximal greatness can be instantiated, it is instantiated.
             ⓘBecause the possible existence of a necessarily existent being entails its actual existence. See The Generic MOA.
          7. Therefore, maximal greatness is instantiated.
          • Joshua Rasmussen, “Plantinga,” in Oppy (ed.), Ontological Arguments (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 176-194.
        • Buras & Cantrell
          1. Natural desires imply there can be something that satisfies them.
          2. We have a natural desire for things only God can satisfy.
             ⓘE.g., objective forgiveness for wrongs we’ve done, communion with God, reuniting with lost loved ones, unending play and enjoyment, that all injustices would be made right, etc.
          3. Therefore, there can be a God.
          4. If there can be a God, there is a God.
             ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See The Generic MOA.
          5. Therefore, there is a God.
          • Todd Buras and Michael Cantrell, “C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia: A New Argument from Desire,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 304-320.
        • Arbour
          1. The more independent arguments there are that p is true, the higher one’s credence should be that p is possibly true.
          2. There are enough independent arguments for the conclusion ‘God exists’ that the belief ‘God possibly exists’ is justified.
          3. Therefore, belief that God possibly exists is justified.
          4. If belief that God possibly exists is justified, belief that God exists is justified.
             ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See The Generic MOA.
          5. Therefore, belief that God exists is justified.
          • Benjamin Arbour, “Dogmatic Open-Mindedness and Open-Minded Dogmatics,” in Trickett and Gilhooly (eds.), Open-Mindedness in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge Scholars, 2019), ch. 5.
        • McIntosh
          1. I am prima facie justified in believing p is possible based on its appearing possible to me IFF if it’s reasonable to believe that if p were impossible, it would probably appear impossible upon further reflection.
             ⓘ(1) is a modalized version of the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: if it appears to S that p, then S is prima facie justified in believing p. If something appears possible to you, that just means you doesn’t see anything contradictory or myopic about it. But if something appears impossible to you, then presumably you do see something contradictory or myopic about it. E.g., Suppose it seems possible to you that there’s a barber who shaves all and only those men in town who do not shave themselves. You’re justified in believing that at first, until you think further about it and realize that if the barber, who’s man in town, does not shave himself, he must shave himself. Contradiction!
          2. It appears to me that God possibly exists.
          3. It is reasonable for me to believe that if it is impossible that God exists, it would probably appear impossible that God exists upon further reflection.
          4. Therefore, I am prima facie justified in believing God possibly exists.
          5. If am prima facie justified in believing God possibly exists, I am prima facie justified in believing God exists.
             ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See The Generic MOA.
          6. I am prima facie justified in believing God exists
          • C. A. McIntosh, “A Defense of Modal Appearances,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (2021), pp. 243-261.
        • Collin
          1. One is prima facie justified in believing ‘Possibly, God does not exist’ only if one is justified in believing
             NEDNot Essential Dependence: the actual physical things are not essentially dependent on God.
             .
             ⓘIf God does not exist, it is essential to actual physical things that they are not dependent on God. But one is justified in believing ‘Possibly, God does not exist’ only if one is justified in believing ‘Actually, physical things are not essentially dependent on God,’ regardless of whether ‘Possibly, God does not exist’ is a coherent description. Cf. a similar case: If John exists it is essential to John that he is begotten of Jack and Sally. One is justified in believing ‘Possibly, John is begotten of Jack and Sally’ only if one is justified in believing ‘Actually, John is begotten of Jack and Sally,’ regardless of whether ‘Possibly, John is begotten of Jack and Sally’ is a coherent description.
          2. One is not justified in believing NED.
             ⓘWe’re not justified in believing ‘Actually, physical things are not essentially dependent on God’ because such justification cannot be gained through considerations of coherence (because ‘Possibly, God exists’ is just as coherent, and so cancels out its complement) and it is not given a posteriori by our best empirical understanding of physical things.
          3. Therefore, one is not prima facie justified in believing ‘Possibly, God does not exist.’
          4. If there is a defeater for ‘Possibly, God does not exist’ but no similar defeater for ‘Possibly, God exists,’ we’re prima facie justified in believing ‘Possibly, God exists’ but not ‘Possibly, God does not exist.’
             ⓘIf God exists, the actual physical things may or may not be essentially dependent on God. So ‘Possibly, God exists’ is compatible with agnosticism about NED.
          5. There is a defeater for ‘Possibly, God does not exist’ but no similar defeater for ‘Possibly, God exists.’
          6. Therefore, we’re prima facie justified in believing ‘Possibly, God exists’.
          • James Collin, “The Reverse Ontological Argument,” Analysis 82/3 (2022), pp. 410-416.

• DESIGNDesign arguments seek to support belief that the universe, or natural things in the universe, are the product of intentional design.

• Immanent Teleology
  • The Fifth Way
    1. Whatever has ends or goals is either intelligent or is directed by intelligence.
    2. Non-sentient things in nature have ends or goals.
       ⓘE.g., the heart pumps blood, smaller celestial bodies orbit larger ones, electrons attract positively charged particles, acorns grow into oak trees, etc. The idea is that we can infer from such regularities in nature that this is how things ought or should operate, not just that that is how they happen to statistically. It’s not that the human heart just happens to beat 40-60 times per minute on average; that is the average because the human heart has that as its goal, or telos.
    3. Therefore, non-sentient things in nature are directed by intelligence.
    • Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2.3. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and Nature, Vol. I. (B. Herder, 1934). John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University Press of America, 2000), pp. 480-485. John Kronen and Sandra Menssen, “Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas’ Fifth Way,” The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 155-180. Edward Feser, “Between Aristotle and William Paley: Aquinas’ Fifth Way,” Nova et Vetera 11/3 (2013), pp. 707-749.
  • Proper Functionalism
    1. Natural organisms and their parts have proper functions.
    2. Whatever has a proper function is the direct or indirect product of intentional design.
       ⓘA thing’s proper function reflects a design plan that specifies how it it’s supposed to work.
    3. Therefore, natural organisms and their parts are the direct or indirect product of intentional design.
    • Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford, 1993), esp. ch. 11. Though he restricts it to organisms and their parts, Plantinga does see this as being a version of Aquinas’ Fifth Way. See also Noological Arguments: Knowledge as Proper Function; Epistemic Probability and Proper Function.
  • Origin of Life
    • Thaxton, Bradley, & Olsen
      1. Given what we know, complex organic life in the universe could not have originated naturalistically.
      2. If, given what we know complex organic life in the universe could not have originated naturalistically, it’s reasonable to believe it originated supernaturalistically.
      3. Therefore, it’s reasonable to belief that complex organic life originated supernaturalistically.
      • Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley, Roger L. Olsen, The Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories (Lewis & Stanley, 1992). Stephen Meyer, The Signature in the Cell (HarperOne, 2009) updates Thaxton, et al.
    • Chandler
      1. If, before there was life on Earth, God will intervene to produce life of Earth, the probability that there will be no life on Earth is zero.
      2. If, before there was life on Earth, God will not intervene to produce life on Earth, the probability that life will originate is very low.
      3. Before there was life on Earth, it was just as reasonable to think God would intervene to produce life on Earth as that he wouldn’t.
      4. Before there was life on Earth, it was true that there will be life on Earth.
      5. Therefore, before there was life on Earth, it was very likely that God will intervene to produce life on Earth.
      6. If it was very likely then that God will intervene to produce life on Earth, it is very likely now that God has intervened to produce life on Earth.
      7. Therefore, it is very likely that God has intervened to produce life on Earth.
      • Hugh Chandler, “Divine Intervention and the Origin of Life,” Faith and Philosophy 10/2 (1993), pp. 170-180
    • Biological Structures & Information
      • Paley
        1. Things with unique parts that function together to achieve a common end, goal, or purpose are the product of intentional design.
        2. There are things in nature with unique parts that function together to achieve a common end, goal, or purpose.
        3. Therefore, there are things in nature that are the product of intentional design.
        • William Paley, Natural Theology. For excellent discussion of Paley, see Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge, 2014), ch. 8.
      • Behe
        1. The best explanation of an
           irreducibly complexA system is irreducibly complex IFF it is composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to a basic function, and where the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to cease functioning.
           system is that it is intelligently designed.
           ⓘFor, according to Behe, “An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly … by sight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional.” Or, at least this is exceedingly improbable. But this is how such a system would have to be produced naturalistically.
        2. There are irreducibly complex systems in nature.
           ⓘBehe cites as examples systems in vision, cilia, flagella, cellular transport, blood-clotting, etc.
        3. Therefore, the best explanation of some systems in nature is that they are intentionally designed.
        • Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press, 1996). Behe, “The Modern Intelligent Design Hypothesis,” in Manson (ed.), God and Design (Routledge, 2003), pp. 277-291. Behe, “The Argument from Biological Complexity,” in Ruloff and Horban, Contemporary Arguments in natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 89-108.
      • Meyer
        1. InformationInformation is “specified complexity,” or a complex arrangement (pattern) that has function or meaning.
           is inherent to the
           building blocks of lifeE.g., genes/gene expression, proteins, DNA.
        2. Information is the product of intelligence.
           ⓘMeyer notes that (2) is assumed by SETI researchers, and is supported by IBE considerations: the only known types of causes that can produce information are intelligent causes, not natural causes like laws or chance events. The odds of any functional protein of a modest length of 150 amino acids being assembled by chance is about one in 10⁷⁴, greater than number of seconds that have elapsed since the Big Bang (10¹⁶), and even the number of atoms in our galaxy (10⁶⁵).
        3. If information is inherent to the building blocks of life, then the building blocks of life themselves are the byproduct of intelligence.
        4. Therefore, the building blocks of life are the byproduct of intelligence.
        • Stephen Meyer, The Signature in the Cell (HarperOne, 2010). Meyer, “The Argument from Biological Information,” in Ruloff and Horban, Contemporary Arguments in natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 109-127. See also the essays in Robert Marks II, et al. (eds.), Biological Information: New Perspectives (World Scientific Publishing Co., 2013).
      • Pruss
        1. DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program.
           ⓘIntentionally designed computer programs have bugs (something not supposed to be in the program). By contrast, computer programs generated by other programs, or ones generated randomly, lack bugs. It is noteworthy, therefore, that DNA has something very much like bugs, i.e., genetic defects.
        2. Intentionally designed computer programs have intelligent designers
        3. If DNA is like an intentionally designed computer program, it, too probably has an intelligent designer.
        4. Therefore, DNA probably has an intelligent designer.
        • Alexander Pruss, “Programs, Bugs, DNA, and a Design Argument” in Nagasawa and Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave, 2009).
      • Fine-Tuning
        • Examples
          Fundamental constants and laws of the universe
          1. Electromagnetic fine-structure constant (α)
          2. Gravitational fine-structure constant (αG)
          3. Weak nuclear force (αW)
          4. Strong nuclear force (αS)
          5. Proton-to-electron mass ratio (mp/me)
          6. Expansion coefficient (Ω0)
          7. Cosmological constant (Λ)

          Examples of fine-tuning

          1. Changes in α or αG by one part in 10⁴⁰ would have precluded the existence of stars like the sun, and, as a consequence, planets habitable by embodied conscious agents (ECAs) like ourselves.
          2. Increasing αS by 1% or decreasing αS by 5% would prevent carbon-based life like ECAs
          3. Changes in either αG or αW by only one part in 10¹⁰⁰ would have prevented the existence of ECAs.
          4. If mp increased by just 0.2%, hydrogen would be unstable, preventing the existence of ECAs.
          5. If mp were slightly weaker, nothing but helium would have been synthesized in the universe, preventing the existence of ECAs.
          6. At 10-⁴³ seconds after the Big Bang (Plank Time), Ω0 had to be within about 10⁶⁰ of critical density to “flatten” space, a prerequisite for the existence of ECAs.
          7. Roger Penrose famously calculated that the exact entropy condition suitable for the formation of life (including ECAs) by chance alone, to be 10¹⁰⁽¹²³⁾.
          8. The chance of Λ falling within the life-permitting range is approximately 1 in 10¹²⁰.
             ⓘFor perspective: “Your odds of guessing a person randomly selected from Rhode Island are around 1 in 1,000,000. Your odds of guessing a person randomly selected from India are around 1 in 1,000,000,000. But your odds of guessing an atom randomly selected from the known universe are a mere 1 in 10⁸⁰—which is not even close to 1 in 10¹²⁰.” (Hawthorne and Isaacs, “Fine-Tuning Fine-Tuning”)
          • Discussion of these and other examples can be found in Paul Davies, The Accidental Universe (Cambridge, 1982). John Barrow and Frank Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford, 1986). John Leslie, Universes (Routledge, 1989). Martin Rees, Just Six Numbers (Basic Books, 2000). See also the relevant essays in Manson (ed.), God and Design (Routledge, 2003). Luke Barnes, “The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life,” Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia 29/4 (2012), pp. 529-564. Geraint Lewis and Luke Barnes, A Fortunate Universe (Cambridge, 2016).
        • Elimination
          1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due either to chance, physical necessity, or design.
          2. Fine-tuning is not due to either chance or physical necessity.
          3. Therefore, the fine-tuning is due to design.
          • William Lane Craig, “Design and the Anthropic Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in Manson (ed.), God and Design (Routledge, 2003), pp. 155-177. Craig, Reasonable Faith (Corssway, 2008), pp. 157-172.
        • Bayes
          • Swinburne
            1. Pr(
               EEvidence of fine-tuning
               |
               KThe universe permits the existence of embodied conscious agents.
               &~
               TTheism
               ) is very low.
            2. Pr(E|K&T) is very high.
            3. Pr(T|K) >> Pr(E|K&~T).
            4. Therefore, Pr(T|E&K) is very high.
            • Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 2004).
          • Rota
            Pr⁡(

            DThe universe is designed by an intelligent agent.

            │

            EThe fundamental constants and laws of the universe fall within the life-permitting range.

            ) =

            Pr⁡(D) x Pr(E|D) / Pr⁡(E│D) x Pr⁡(D) + Pr⁡(E│~D) x Pr⁡ (~D)

            1. If Pr(E|~D) is n, then Pr(D|E) is very high.
               ⓘIf n is sufficiently low, Pr(D|E) will be very high even if Pr(E|D) and Pr(D) are themselves low. For example, the cosmological constant falling within the life-permitting range by chance alone is 1/10¹²⁰. Suppose, then, that Pr(E|~D) is 1/10¹²⁰. That’s so low that Pr(D|E) would be over 99.9999999% even if Pr(E|D) = 1/trillion and Pr(D) = 1/billion.
            2. Pr(E|~D) is n.
            3. Therefore, Pr(D|E) is very high.
            • Michael Rota, “The Fine-Tuning Argument,” in Ruloff and Horban, Contemporary Arguments in natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 69-87.
        • Likelihood
          1. Pr(
             KThe universe’s laws, constants, and initial conditions are such as to permit the existence of embodied conscious agents.
             |
             NSUNaturalism is true, and there is only a single universe.
             ) << 1.
          2. ~Pr(K|
             TTheism
             ) << 1.
          3. Therefore, Pr(T|K) >> Pr(NSU|K).
          • Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 4. Collins’ book, A Well-Tempered Universe, has been forthcoming for over 20 years.
        • Discoverability
          1. The values of certain physical constants fall within the
             discoverability-optimality rangeThe range of values within the anthropic range that make the universe optimal for scientific discovery and investigation by embodied conscious agents like ourselves.
             within the
             anthropic rangeOf all the possible values fundamental physical constants could assume, the anthropic range is the tiny range of values that permit the existence of embodied conscious agents like ourselves.
             .
             ⓘE.g., the universe has relatively low entropy throughout. But embodies conscious agents like us need only a regional pocket of low entropy. Yet the general low entropy makes the universe optimal for observational discoveries in astrophysics and cosmology.
          2. If naturalism is true, it is enormously improbable that the values of certain physical constants would fall within the discoverability-optimality range within the anthropic range.
          3. If theism is true, it is not improbable that the values of certain physical constants would fall within the discoverability-optimality range within the anthropic range.
          4. Therefore, that the values of certain physical constants would fall within the discoverability-optimality range within the anthropic range strongly confirms theism over naturalism.
          • Robin Collins, “Fine-Tuning for Discoverability,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 89-107.
        • Wider Teleology
          1. If the universe and Earth are conspicuously suitable for intelligent, moral, aesthetic agents in many ways, then we’re justified in thinking the universe
             and Earth are a theater designed by God for such agents.
             ⓘF. R. Tennant argued that the strongest case for design is not to be found in any one particular instance (narrow teleology), since “it is conceivable that every such instance may individually admit of explanation in terms of proximate causes.” The best case for design “consists rather in the conspiration of innumerable causes to produce, by their united and reciprocal action, and to maintain” a universe that as a whole is conspicuously suitable for intelligent, moral, aesthetic agents. Tennant calls this “wider teleology.”
          2. The universe and Earth are conspicuously suitable for intelligent, moral, aesthetic agents in many ways.
             ⓘTennant’s own examples of wider teleology: (i) The universe has the structure necessary for organic life. (ii) The universe has the ingredients necessary for organic life. (iii) Those ingredients have come together in at least one environment that is not just habitable, but conducive to the evolution and flourishing of organic life. (iv) The universe exhibits a regularity and order that makes it intelligible to some of its inhabitants (us). (v) Those inhabitants also find the universe beautiful. (vi) Those inhabitants can act it meaningful, moral ways. For other examples, see references.
          3. Therefore, we’re justified in thinking the universe and Earth are a theater designed by God for intelligent, moral, aesthetic agents.
          • F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology Vol. II (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 78-120. For more on examples of wider teleology in biochemistry, see Michael Denton, Nature’s Destiny (Free Press, 1998). For examples from astronomy, see Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards, The Privileged Planet (Regnery, 2004).
        • Perceiving Design
          1. If something appears designed, then we’re prima facie justified in believing it is the product of intentional design.
             ⓘEven if something that appears designed can be explained via natural processes, it might be that God uses or guides those processes in the production of his designs. This may help explain why belief that the natural world is designed is so persistent, despite the prevalence of naturalistic theories, such as Darwinism, that might be thought to play a debunking role.
          2. Some things in nature appear designed.
             ⓘBiologists themselves say organisms appear or look designed. Dawkins: “Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose” (Dawkins). “Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved” (Crick).
          3. Therefore, we’re prima facie justified in believing some things in nature are the product of intentional design.
          • Del Ratzsch, “Perceiving Design,” in Manson (ed.), God and Design (Routledge, 2003), pp. 124-144. Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies (Oxford, 2011), ch. 8. C. Stephen Evans, “The Naïve Teleological Argument,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 108-122.

• MORALMoral arguments appeal to facts about morality and our moral beliefs, behaviors, and experience as support for theism.

• Moral Objectivity
  • Objective Morality Generally
    1. Morality is objective only if God exists.
    2. Morality is objective.
    3. Therefore, God exists.

    Abductive formulation:

    1. Morality is objective.
    2. If morality is objective, then God is the best explanation for its being objective.
    3. Therefore, God is the best explanation for its being objective.
    4. Therefore, (probably) God exists.
    • William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Crossway, 2008), pp. 172-183. Adam Johnson (ed.), A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? (Routledge, 2020).
  • Objective Obligations
    1. We have objective moral obligations
    2. If we have objective moral obligations, they are best understood as divine commands.
       ⓘObjective moral obligations are (i) like authoritative imperatives, not descriptives; (ii) impositions, we ought to obey even when we don’t want to. They have “umph”; they are intrinsically motivating; (iii) they seem deeply social, such that disobedience incurs objective guilt and offense to a person. It would be exceedingly odd if there are objective moral obligations (so understood) if naturalism were true. Yet this is exactly what we would expect if theism were true: they are the imperatives of a personal, good God, who has the power authority to impose them on all of humanity.
    3. Therefore, objective moral obligations are best understood as divine commands.
    4. If objective moral obligations are best understood as divine commands, God exists.
    5. Therefore, God exists.
    • George Mavrodes, “Religion and the Queerness of Morality,” in Audi and Wainwright (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment Cornell, 1986), pp. 213–226. Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford, 1999). C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford, 2013).
  • Evil, Wrongdoing, and Conscience
    • Normative Implications of Evil
      1. Evil contrastively implies that there is a way the world ought to be.
         ⓘSome come close to defining evil this way, as a deviation, distortion, or corruption of the way things are supposed to be.
      2. There is a way the world ought to be only if there is an intention or goal or purpose behind it.
      3. Therefore, there is an intention or goal or purpose behind the world.
      4. There is an intention or goal or purpose behind the world only if God exists.
      5. Therefore, God exists.
      • Gregory Ganssle, “Evil as Evidence for Christianity,” in Meister and Dew (eds.), God and Evil (IVP, 2013), ch. 15.
    • Evil as Privatio Boni
      1. Evil is a privation of goodness.
      2. If evil is a privation of goodness, goodness is ontologically and explanatorily prior to evil.
      3. If goodness is ontologically and explanatorily prior to evil, there is more goodness in the world than evil.
      4. If there is more goodness in the world than evil, probably, God exists.
         ⓘThink of this as the converse of the problem of evil, that if there is more evil in the world than good, probably, God doesn’t exist.
      5. Therefore, probably, God exists.
      • David Alexander, God, Goodness, and Evil (Bloomsbury, 2012), ch. 5.
    • Horrendous Evils
      1. Some evils are so bad that they seem to have a non-naturalistic dimension to them.
      2. If (1), we are justified in thinking they do have a non-naturalistic dimension to them.
      3. The best explanation of there being evils so horrendous that they have a non-naturalistic dimension is that good and evil have deep spiritual significance.
      4. Therefore, probably, good and evil have deep spiritual significance.
      5. If good and evil have deep spiritual significance, then something like theism is probably true.
         ⓘIf naturalism is true, there is no more to human evil than the human-analogue of animal savagery. But this just doesn’t seem to capture all there is to evil. But if theism is true, horrendous evils are deep defiance of a morally perfect being and the goodness of his creation.
      6. Therefore, something like theism is probably true.
      • Alvin Plantinga, “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 476-477. See also C. S. Lewis, discussed in Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument (Oxford, 2019), p. 167. Other formulations are considered in Daryl Ooi, “Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils,” Philosophy Compass 17/8 (2022).
    • Intrinsic Harmfulness of Wrongdoing
      1. Wrongdoing is intrinsically
         harmfulBy “harm”, Dore does not mean pain or suffering or feeling guilty, but adverse effects on one’s objective well-being. Metaphorically, wrongdoing is soul-withering to the wrongdoer.
         to the wrongdoer.
         ⓘThe idea here is that morality is “overriding” in that one’s well-being is affected by one’s moral deeds. E.g., Plato, Gyges ring.
      2. Wrongdoing is intrinsically harmful to the wrongdoer only if that harm is punishment from a God-like being.
         ⓘWrongdoers never intend to harm themselves when they commit wrongs, and can escape punishment from men. Only a God-like being has the knowledge and power to inflict intrinsic harm on wrongdoers whenever they commit wrongs.
      3. Therefore, there is a God-like being.
      • Clement Dore, Theism (D. Reidel, 1984), ch. 4
    • Guilty Conscience
      1. Guilt, shame, responsibility, etc. are only appropriately felt in relation to other moral agents.
      2. But sometimes we appropriately feel guilt, shame, responsibility, etc. for deeds done in secret (that harm no others).
      3. Therefore guilt, shame, responsibility, etc. for deeds done in secret are appropriately felt only if there’s another moral agent that’s privy to deeds done in secret.
      4. Therefore, there’s another moral agent that’s privy to deeds done in secret.
      5. If there’s a moral agent privy to deeds done in secret, it’s a God-like being.
         ⓘThe being would have to be omnipresent, omniscient, morally authoritative, etc.
      6. Therefore, there is a God-like being.
      • John Henry Newman, A Grammar of Assent (1870), ch. 5. John Cottingham, “Conscience: What Is Its History and Does It Have a Future?” History of European Ideas 45/3 (2019), pp. 338-345.
    • The Practical and Rational Demands of Morality
      • Kant
        1. We ought (morally) to promote the realization of the
           highest goodThe highest good, according to Kant is perfect proportionment of happiness to virtue. I.e., You are happy (in the eudaimonistic sense) to the extent that you are virtuous.
        2. What we ought to do must be possible for us to do.
        3. It is possible for us to promote the realization of the highest good only if there exists a God who makes that realization possible.
           ⓘBecause only God can ensure perfect proportionment of happiness to virtue.
        4. Therefore, God exists.
        • Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. See also Stewart Goetz, The Purpose of Life (Continuum, 2012), ch. 2. A similar argument is discussed in Allen Wood, Kant and Religion (Cambridge, 2020), p. 46ff.
      • Kant & Sidgwick
        1. Acting morally is always rational only if it’s always what’s ultimately best for me.
           ⓘSidgwick thought the central problem of ethics was showing how (1) could be true. It must be rational for me to act morally. Otherwise noble deeds like self-sacrifice and altruism might be irrational! But it seems true that it’s never irrational to be altruistic.
        2. Acting morally is always what’s ultimately best for me only if God exists.
           ⓘ(2) is equivalent to: if God does not exist, acting morally not always what’s ultimately best for me; morality and self-interest come apart, leaving us with the question of why I should be moral in times where I’d personally be worse off for doing so. It is irrational to act altruistically.
        3. Therefore, acting morally is always rational only if God exists.
        4. Acting morally is always rational.
        5. Therefore, God exists.
        • Gathered from David Baggett and Jerry Walls’s discussion of Sidgwick and Kant in Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford, 2011), pp. 12-15.
      • Adams
        1. If a belief is
           demoralizingA belief is demoralizing when it weakens or deteriorates moral motivation.
           , it is morally undesirable.
        2. If a belief is morally undesirable, there is moral advantage in believing the opposite.
        3. It is demoralizing to believe that there is no
           moral orderThere is moral order if there is a balance of good over evil in the universe, and our moral acts make a significant different to that balance.
           .
           ⓘBecause we would have to regard it as very likely that the history of the universe will not be good on the whole, no matter what we do.
        4. Therefore, it is morally undesirable to believe that there is no moral order.
        5. Therefore, there is moral advantage in believing there is moral order.
        6. Theism provides the most adequate theory of moral order.
        7. If theism provides the most adequate theory of a moral order, there is a moral advantage in accepting theism.
        8. Therefore, there is a moral advantage in accepting theism.
        • Robert Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief,” in Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief (Notre Dame, 1979), pp. 116-140.
      • Zagzebski
        1. It is rational to try to be moral only if it’s rational to believe the attempt would likely be successful.
        2. But it’s not rational to believe the attempt would likely be successful if all we have is our own human faculties to go on.
           ⓘBecause if all we have is our own faculties, we can’t be confident that (i) we have genuine moral knowledge, given the depth and diversity of moral disagreements, or (ii) that we can overcome moral weakness and bring about good in the world, or (iii) that our moral efforts won’t be in vain in the end.
        3. But it is rational to try to be moral.
        4. Therefore, it’s rational to believe the attempt would likely be successful.
        5. Therefore, we have more than just our own human faculties to go on.
        6. If a theory postulates exactly what more we need to be rational in believing the attempt at being moral would likely be successful, then its rational to believe that theory.
        7. Christian theism postulates exactly what more we need to be rational in believing the attempt at being moral would likely be successful.
           ⓘOn Christian theism, we have divine revelation, assurance and guidance, and grace, and providence—exactly what we need to be confident that we have genuine moral knowledge can to overcome moral weakness and bring about good in the world, and that our moral efforts won’t be in vain in the end.
        8. Therefore, it’s rational to believe Christian theism.
        • Linda Zagzebski, “Does Ethics need God?” -Faith and Philosophy 4/3 (1987), pp. 294-303.
      • Hare
        1. If one ought to x, one can do x
        2. One ought to live up to the demands of morality.
        3. Therefore, one can live up to the demands of morality.
        4. One can live up to the demands of morality only if one has the requisite extra-human assistance.
           ⓘHare speaks of the “moral gap” between the demand that morality places on us and our natural capacity to live up to it. Because morality essentially demands that we be perfect, the gap can be filled only with “extra-human assistance.”
        5. Therefore, one has the requisite extra-human assistance.
        6. If a theory postulates exactly the “extra-human assistance” needed to live up to the demands of morality, it is rational to believe that theory.
        7. Christian theism postulates exactly the “extra-human assistance” needed to live up to the demands of morality.
           ⓘThe requisite “extra-human assistance” to live up to the demands of morality are found in Christianity’s doctrines of atonement, justification, and sanctification.
        8. Therefore, it is rational to believe Christian theism.
        • John Hare, The Moral Gap (Oxford, 1996).
      • Layman
        1. In every actual case, one has most reason to do what is morally required.
           ⓘ(1) just says that there is overriding reason to perform one’s moral duty.
        2. If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases where morality requires that one make a great sacrifice for only modest benefits.
           ⓘSuppose you are poor and destitute, but have access to a million dollars that, if taken, would never be missed or discovered stolen. Not taking the money would be a great sacrifice for the modest benefit of a clean conscience. If there is no God or afterlife, there are no overriding reasons not to steal the money.
        3. If in a given case morality requires that one make a great sacrifice for only modest benefits, then one does not have the most reason to do what is morally required.
        4. Therefore, if there is not God and no life after death, then in some cases one does not have most reason to do what is morally required.
        5. Therefore, it’s false that there is no God and no after life.
        • C. Stephen Layman, “God and the Moral Order,” Faith and Philosophy 19/3 (2002), pp. 304-316.
      • Oderberg
        1. We live in a
           rational moral orderWe live in a rational moral order if it always makes rational sense to behave morally.
           .
        2. If we live in a rational moral order, there is
           cosmic justiceThere is cosmic justice if all virtue is rewarded and all vice is punished.
           .
        3. Therefore, there is cosmic justice.
        4. If there is cosmic justice, there must be a cosmic judge who administers it.
        5. Therefore, there is a cosmic judge who administers it.
        • David Oderberg, “Morality, Religion, and Cosmic Justice,” Philosophical Investigations 34/2 (2011), pp. 189-213.
      • Moral Epistemology
        • Universal Moral Beliefs
          1. Certain moral beliefs are shared by all of humanity.
          2. If certain moral beliefs are shared by all of humanity, God is the best explanation for that.
          3. Therefore, God is the best explanation for there being certain moral beliefs are shared by all of humanity.
          4. Therefore, (probably) God exists.
          • Something like this argument can be gathered from C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man.
        • Moral Knowledge
          1. We have moral knowledge.
          2. If naturalism is true, then we (very probably) don’t have moral knowledge.
             ⓘIf naturalism is true, the faculties we use to form moral beliefs aren’t aimed at truth, but fitness. So while it’s possible that we have true moral beliefs, but we shouldn’t trust them.
          3. If theism is true, then we (very probably) do have moral knowledge.
             ⓘIf theism is true, God, as a moral being keen on us being moral too, likely wired our moral belief-forming faculties to aim at truth.
          4. Therefore, if we have moral knowledge, that is strong evidence for theism and against naturalism.
          5. Therefore, moral knowledge is strong evidence for theism and against naturalism.
          • Mark Linville, “The Moral Argument,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 7. Angus Menuge, “Why Humans Rights Cannot be Naturalized: The Contingency Problem,” in Menuge (ed.), Legitimizing Human Rights (Ashgate, 2013), ch. 3. Philip Swensen and Dustin Crummett, “God and Moral Knowledge,” in Rasmussen and Vallier (eds.), The New Theist Response to the New Atheists (Routledge, 2020), ch. 3.
        • Apprehension of Moral Norms
          1. We have capacity to apprehend objective moral norms.
             ⓘRitchie is concerned more with explaining epistemic access to moral truths rather than justifying moral knowledge.
          2. If (1), the best explanation for this is that our cognitive faculties are intended to apprehend objective moral norms.
          3. Therefore, probably, our cognitive faculties are intended to apprehend objective moral norms.
          4. If (3), theism is the best explanation for that.
             ⓘNaturalism leaves us with an explanatory gap between moral ontology and moral epistemology. The best way to fill the gap is if our cognitive faculties are intended to apprehend moral truths. Theism closes the gap, since on theism our cognitive are intended by God to apprehend moral truths.
          5. Therefore, theism is the best explanation for our having the capacity to apprehend objective moral norms.
          • Angus Ritchie, From Morality to Metaphysics (Oxford, 2012).
        • Altruism
          • Schloss
            1. Genuine altruismGenuine altruism is sacrificial behavior exclusively for another; it incurs no benefit to oneself, kin, or group.
               exists and is rational.
            2. If naturalism is true, genuine altruism does not exist and is irrational.
               ⓘTrue virtually by definition. Natural selection entails that genuine altruism doesn’t exist, or if it does, it is irrational.
            3. Therefore, naturalism is false.
            4. If theism is true, genuine altruism probably does exist and is rational.
               ⓘEspecially if Christian theism is true, since humans are created in the image of a God who is agape (self-giving love) and therefore altruistic.
            5. Therefore, the existence and rationality of genuine altruism is strongly confirms theism.
            • Jeffrey Schloss, “Evolutionary Accounts of Altruism and the Problem of Goodness by Design,” in Dembski (ed.), Mere Creation (IVP, 1998), ch. 10. See also Colin Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethic (Cambridge, 2001).
          • Pruss
            1. Moral altruismMoral altruism is morally praiseworthy, sacrificial action for another’s good.
               is irreducibly normative.
            2. There can be no naturalistic explanation for moral altruism if moral altruism is irreducibly normative.
               ⓘEven if there can be a naturalistic explanation for moral altruism (i.e., how it evolved, why we have a tendency toward it), there cannot be a naturalistic explanation for why moral altruism is normal/appropriate because naturalistic, scientific explanation is always in terms of nonnormative facts.
            3. Therefore, there can be no naturalistic explanation for moral altruism.
            4. If there are good theistic explanations for moral altruism, then moral altruism is evidence for theism.
            5. There are good theistic explanations for moral altruism.
               ⓘGood theistic explanations of moral altruism: moral altruism is normal because proper functioning humans will be morally altruistic, or perhaps God created human nature to reflect his own, morally altruistic nature.
            6. Therefore, moral altruism is evidence for theism.
            • Alexander Pruss, “Altruism, Normalcy, and God,” in Nowack and Coakley (eds.), Evolution, Games, and God (Harvard, 2013).
          • Moral Worth, Equality, and Rights
            • Inherent Worth
              1. Human persons have inherent value/worth.
              2. The fact that humans have inherent value/worth is much more likely if theism is true than if naturalism is true.
                 ⓘIn order to explain (1), naturalism must explain: (i) how there has come to be human persons in a fundamentally impersonal universe (i.e., mind from matter); (ii) how there has come to be value from a fundamentally valueless universe; (iii) how to unite the personal with the valuable in such a way they persons have inherent moral worth.
              3. Therefore, the fact that human persons have inherent value/worth is strong evidence for theism and against naturalism.
              • Mark Linville, “The Moral Argument,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 7. David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 4.
            • Equal Worth
              1. All humans have equal moral worth.
                 ⓘNote that saying we have inherent moral worth is not the same as saying we have equal worth.
              2. All humans have equal moral worth only if there is something all humans have in common in virtue of which we have equal moral worth.
              3. Therefore, there is something all humans have in common in virtue of which we have equal moral worth.
              4. If naturalism is true, there is nothing all humans have in common in virtue of which we have equal moral worth.
                 ⓘWhat could it be? Not any accidentally had or degreed property, like consciousness, intelligence, skill or talents or abilities, good character, personality, power, influence, wealth, nationality, since not everyone has these in equal measure.
              5. Therefore, naturalism is false.
              6. If there is something all humans have in common in virtue of which we have equal moral worth, God is the best explanation for that.
                 ⓘGod can serve as a transcendent source of value and distribute equally that in virtue of which we have equal moral worth: maybe we equally resemble God in relevant respects, or are children/friends of God, or are equally loved by God.
              7. Therefore, God is the best explanation all humans having equal moral worth.
              • J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (SCM, 2009), ch. 6.
            • Natural Rights
              1. Humans have natural rights.
              2. Humans have natural rights only if humans have inherent and equal worth.
              3. The best explanation of humans having inherent and equal moral worth is that that status is bestowed on them as an honor from a proper authority.
                 ⓘJust as a king bestows an honor on a subject. The subject might not even be worthy per se. The king might do so out of love and grace or the desire for friendship.
              4. The only proper authority that could bestow inherent and equal worth as an honor on all humans is God.
                 ⓘOnly God has authority to bestow such honor, and does so in virtue of his own uprightness, virtue, value, etc.
              5. Therefore, probably, God exists.
              • Nicholas Wolterstorff, “On Secular and Theistic Groundings of Human Rights,” and “Grounding the Rights we Have as Human Persons” in Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. Terence Cuneo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chs. 7 and 8, respectively. See also John Warwick Montgomery, Human Rights and Human Dignity (Zondervan, 1986) and the relevant essays in Angus Menuge (ed.), Legitimizing Human Rights (Ashgate, 2013).
            • Moral Progress
              • Alston
                1. There are many people who believe God has promised to help them develop morally and spiritually who then do develop morally and spiritually.
                2. If this phenomenon is widespread enough, it is evidence that God does help people develop morally and spiritually (and so is evidence of God’s existence).
                3. It is widespread enough.
                   ⓘConsider the many examples of dramatic conversions and subsequent life changes, and the lives of saints.
                4. Therefore, this phenomenon is evidence of God’s existence.
                • William Alston, “The Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief,” in Radcliffe and White (eds.), Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief (Open Court, 1993), pp. 1-34. Michael Rota, Taking Pascal’s Wager (IVP, 2016), chs. 13-15.
              • Copan & Wolf
                1. If a religion’s central teachings dramatically transform people and the world for the better, it is rational to commit to that religion.
                2. Christianity’s central teachings have, and continue to, dramatically transform people the world for the better.
                   ⓘEarly Christians put into practice the belief that all humans are created in the image of God, following Jesus’ example and admonition to love your neighbor as yourself in such a way that Christianity became a catalyst for change throughout the whole world. It inspired belief that all humans have inherent worth; changed the way people saw and treated widows, the homeless, the poor, social outcasts; ended gladiatorial blood sport; elevated the status of women; established charities, hospitals, more humane systems of government; promoted education; and was the inspiration that drove scientific progress.
                3. Therefore, it’s rational to commit to Christianity.
                • Paul Copan and Thom Wolf, “Another Dimension of the Moral Argument: The Voice of Jesus and the Historical Fruits of the Christian Faith,” in Rasmussen and Vallier (ed.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists (Routledge, 2020), ch. 10. Rodney Stark, The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success (Random House, 2006). Nick Spencer, The Evolution of the West: How Christianity has Shaped our Values (SPCK, 2016).

• MIRACLESArguments from miracles appeal to certain events, historical or contemporary, as support for belief in supernatural activity of a God-like being.

• Miracles Argument Schema
  1. Miracles are events the best explanation for which invokes a supernatural agent.
  2. Events of those kinds have actually occurred.
  3. Therefore, there is a supernatural agent.
  • Schema adapted from Daniel Bonevac, “The Argument from Miracles,” in Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 3 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 16-40. For thorough review of historical and contemporary accounts of miraculous events, see Craig Keener, Miracles Vols. 1 & 2 (Baker Academic, 2011). Keener, Miracles Today (Baker Academic, 2021). A nice, albeit brief, treatment of miracles and other religions, see David Clark, “Miracles in the World Religions,” in Geivett and Habermas (eds.), In Defense of Miracles (IVP, 1997), ch.12

• Exodus
  1. A tradition is likely true if it (i) is accepted by a nation; describes (ii) a national experience of a previous generation of that nation; which (iii) would be expected to create a continuous national memory until the tradition is in place; is (iv) insulting to that nation; and (v) makes universal, difficult and severe demands on that nation.
     ⓘKuzari Principle, named after 12th century Jewish philosopher HaLevi’s dialogue, The Kuzari.

  1. The Kuzari Principle is true.
  2. If the Exodus is a tradition that meets the criteria of the Kuzari Principle, then it’s likely true.
     ⓘCentral to the Exodus tradition are the dramatic miracles of the ten plagues, the parting of the Red Sea, and so on.
  3. The Exodus is a tradition that meets the criteria of the Kuzari Principle.
  4. Therefore, the Exodus tradition is probably true.
  5. If the Exodus tradition is probably true, God probably exists.
  6. Therefore, God probably exists.
  • Tyron Goldschmidt, “A Proof of Exodus,” in Lebens, et al. (eds.), Jewish Philosophy in an Analytic Age (Oxford, 2019), pp. 222-242. On the general reliability of the Exodus narrative, see James K. Hoffmeier, Israel in Egypt: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Exodus Tradition (Oxford, 1996); Hoffmeier, Ancient Israel in Sinai: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Wilderness Tradition (Oxford, 2005). Hoffmeier, et al. (eds.), “Did I Not Bring Israel Out of Egypt?” (Eisenbrauns, 2016). K. A. Kitchens, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Eerdmans, 2003).

• Fulfilled Prophecy
  • General
    1. If there is good evidence of
       fulfilled prophesyIf an event foretold at t1 occurs at t2 that (i) could not have been predicted by natural means, (ii) could not have been brought about by natural means because it was foretold, and (iii) is highly unlikely to have occurred as foretold by chance, then the event is justifiably taken to be fulfilled prophecy. (Mackie)
       , that is good evidence of divine inspiration of people and divine orchestration of events.
    2. There is good evidence of fulfilled prophesies.
    3. Therefore, there is good evidence of divine inspiration of people and divine orchestration of events.
    • Peter Stoner, Science Speaks (Moody Press, ed. 1975). Robert Newman (ed.), The Evidence of Prophecy (Interdisciplinary Biblical Research Institute, 1998). Robert Newman, “Fulfilled Prophecy as Miracle,” in Geivett and Habermas (eds.), In Defense of Miracles (IVP, 1997), ch.13. Hugh Gauch, “Best Practices for Prophecy Arguments,” Philosophia Christi 16/2 (2014), pp. 255-282.
  • Messianic
    1. If the central claims of a religion are supported by apparently fulfilled prophecy, that is powerful evidence for the truth of that religion.
    2. The central claims of Christianity are supported by messianic prophecies apparently fulfilled by Jesus.
       ⓘAccording to Ps 22 and Is 53, the Messiah would do no violence, be silent under affliction and accusation, have his garments ripped and sold, be exposed and unclothed to public gaze and to mockery, have his hands and feet pierced and bones disjointed but not broken, suffer exhaustion and dehydration, be scourged, categorized alongside the wicked in death, and make his grave with the rich.
    3. Therefore, messianic prophecies apparently fulfilled by Jesus are powerful evidence for the truth of Christianity.
       ⓘWhere M = “Jesus is the messiah” predicted in Ps 22 and Is 53, Lydia McGrew estimates the cumulative Bayes factor for these is 2.5 x 107 in favor of M to ~M. I.e., the evidence confirms M over ~M by a factor of 25 million.
    • Lydia McGrew, “Probabilistic Issues Concerning Jesus of Nazareth and Messianic Death Prophecies,” Philosophia Christi 15/2 (2013), pp. 85-102. Douglas Scott, Is Jesus of Nazareth the Predicted Messiah? (Wipf & Stock, 2018).
  • Resurrection
    • Historical Evidence
      By commonly accepted historiographical standards, it is credible that:

      1. Jesus died by crucifixion on a Friday.
      2. Jesus was buried in a known tomb.
      3. The tomb was reported empty the following Sunday.
      4. The tomb was first discovered empty by women.
      5. Romans accused the disciples of stealing Jesus’ body.
      6. Individuals, groups, friends, and foes subsequently testified to seeing Jesus alive and well.
      7. The disciples’ claim that Jesus was “resurrected” was a novel use of the term/concept.
      8. Jesus’ followers abruptly changed observing sabbath from Saturday to Sunday.
      9. Many converted to Christian belief, despite severe persecution.
      10. The apostles and other Christians were martyred, with none recanting their testimony.

      ⋮
      En. …
      • Some or all of the above are defended in the following: William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (Edwin Mellon, 2002). N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress, 2003). Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford, 2003). Dale Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and its Interpreters (T&T Clark, 2005). Timothy and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 11. Michael Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (IVP, 2010). Gary Habermas, Risen Indeed: A Historical Investigation into the Resurrection of Jesus (Lexham Press, 2021). .
    • Craig
      1. E1 &…En.
      2. The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” is the best explanation of E1 &…En.
      3. The hypothesis “God raised Jesus from the dead” entails God exists.
      4. Therefore, God exists.
      • William Lane Craig formulates the argument this way in many of his debates. E.g., Craig and Sinnot-Armstrong, God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist (Oxford, 2004).
    • McGrew
      1. Pr(E1 &…En|
         RThe bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth ca. AD 33.
         / Pr(E1 &…En|~R) >> 1.
      2. Therefore, E1 &…En highly confirms R over ~R
      • Timothy and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 11.
    • Swinburne
      1. The prior probability that God exists is moderate.
      2. If God exists, it’s as likely as not that He would become incarnate.
         ⓘWere a loving God to exist, it would not be surprising if he provided sinners a means of atonement, solidarity in their suffering, and an exemplary life to emulate. Becoming incarnate is a good way to do this.
      3. If God became incarnate, He would probably (i) live a certain kind of life, and (ii) end it with a divine signature like a “super miracle”.
         ⓘWe would expect God incarnate to live a holy life, impart good moral teaching, lead a ministry of healing, claim to be divine, explain the means of atonement, and found an institution to continue his message.
      4. It just so happens that we have good historical evidence that (i) one man, Jesus, lived the kind of life we would expect God incarnate to live, and (ii) that man’s life ended with a super miracle.
         ⓘThe key move in Swinburne’s argument is the coincidental “match” between (3), argued a priori, and (4), argued a posterori. That there was a concrete historical person who likely fulfilled what we would likely expect of God in the abstract makes it very probable that that person, Jesus, was God incarnate, who resurrected from the dead.
      5. Therefore, if there is a God, it is very probable that He became incarnate in Jesus and resurrected from the dead.
      6. Therefore, it is very probable that there is a God who became incarnate in Jesus and resurrected from the dead.
      • Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford, 2003). Swinburne, Was Jesus God? (Oxford, 2008).
    • Revelatory Content
      Argument Schema

      1. The revelatory content R has the characteristic of being F.
         ⓘⓘSubstitute for F: beautiful, sublime, resilient, fertile, original, unified, intelligent, wise, affecting, counter-cultural, uplifting to the hopeless and bedeviled – the list goes on.
      2. If R has the characteristic of being F, then R can be recognized by an inquirer with an adequate cognitive and affective base to be F.
      3. If R can be recognized by an inquirer with an adequate cognitive and affective base to be F, then the plausibility of R and the plausibility that R was revealed can rightly be enhanced for the inquirer through recognition that R is F.
      4. Therefore, the plausibility of R and the plausibility that R was revealed can rightly be enhanced for an inquirer with an adequate cognitive and affective base, through recognition that R is F.

      Application to the Incarnation

      1. God’s becoming incarnate is
         fittingx is fitting for y if x is appropriate for a y’s nature.
         .
         ⓘFirst, the incarnation makes the invisible intelligible to us through the visible, and that’s helpful to us. Second, God is by nature is good, and the nature of goodness is diffusive: the incarnation is the natural overflow of God’s goodness into the physical world. The most fitting physical form God could take on is humanity, for rational animals (humans) are the highest of the creatures. Rationality makes possible language, morality, meaning, love, art, technology, and so on. Thus it is fitting that God, in his goodness, should enter the world by becoming incarnate in human form.
      2. If God’s becoming incarnate is fitting, then an inquirer with an adequate cognitive and affective base can recognize God’s becoming incarnate as fitting.
      3. If God’s becoming incarnate can be recognized by an inquirer with an adequate cognitive and affective base to be fitting, then the plausibility of God’s becoming incarnate and the plausibility of the claim that it was revealed that God became incarnate can rightly be enhanced for the inquirer through recognition that the incarnation is fitting.
      4. Therefore, the plausibility of God’s becoming incarnate and the plausibility of the claim that it was revealed that God became incarnate can rightly be enhanced for the inquirer through recognition that the incarnation is fitting.
      • Sandra Menssen and Thomas Sullivan, “The Argument from Ramified Natural Theology,” in Ruloff and Horban, Contemporary Arguments in natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 311-325.
    • Lewis’ Trilemma
      1. Jesus claimed, either explicitly or implicitly, to be divine.
      2. If Jesus was wrong in claiming to be divine, Jesus was either mad (lunatic) or bad (liar).
      3. It’s implausible that Jesus was either mad or bad.
      4. Therefore, it’s plausible that Jesus was not wrong in claiming to be divine.
      5. Therefore, it’s rational to believe Jesus is divine.
      • Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology (Oxford, 2006), ch. 9. I have slightly modified Davis’ formulation. Davis further defends the argument in “The Mad/Bad/God Trilemma: A Reply to Daniel Howard-Snyder,” Faith and Philosophy 21/4 (2004), pp. 480-492. For C. S. Lewis’ classic statement, see Mere Christianity (Macmillan, 1960), pp. 40-41. Other notable defenses include John Montgomery, History and Christianity (Bethany House, 1986). Peter Kreeft, Between Heaven and Hell (IVP, 1982). C. Stephen Evans, Why Believe (Eerdmans, 1996), ch. 8.

• EXPERIENTIALExperiential arguments appeal to experiences of religious significance as support for theism.

• Religious Experience
  Religious experiences are common and diverse, ranging from the mundane to the sublime, are described as direct, or mediated through nature, other people, and objects. Despite this variety, such experiences commonly convey that there is something divine that transcends the natural world, such as God or other supernatural beings, and inspire religious convictions and conversions.
  • For classic discussion and examples, see William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy. Modern treatments with interest in their evidential value include C. F. Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford, 1989). Phillip Wiebe, God and Other Spirits (Oxford, 2004). Dale Allison, Encountering Mystery: Religious Experience in a Secular Age (Eerdmans, 2022). Perhaps the largest collection of first-hand accounts of religious experiences (over 6k) is housed by the Alister Hardy Religious Experience Research Center.
  • Parity
    • General Experience
      1. If it seems to me that p, I am prima facie justified in believing p.
         ⓘThe Principle of Credulity: “How things seem to be is good grounds for a belief about how things are.” Note that ‘seemings’ confer only prima facie justification, i.e., there are conditions in which one’s justification is removed or undermined by defeaters—reasons to doubt what initially seemed to be the case.

      1. If it seems to me that God exists, I am prima facie justified in believing God exists.
      2. It seems to me that God exists.
      3. Therefore, I am prima facie justified in believing God exists.
      • Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 2004), ch. 13. Richard Swinburne, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience,” in Benton et al. (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford, 2018), pp. 322-338. Other defenses of a similar approach include Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism (D. Reidel, 1983). Kai-Man Kwan, The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust, and God (Continuum, 2011).
    • Aesthetic Experience
      1. If the aesthetic experiences of
         aesthetesAesthetic experts. Wine taster, musician, painter, food critic, etc.
         justifies their aesthetic beliefs, the religious experiences of religious people justifies their religious beliefs.
         ⓘReligious people are like aesthetes in relevant respects: they undergo practices and disciplines that refine and develop a kind of experience.
      2. The aesthetic experiences of aesthetes justifies their aesthetic beliefs.
         ⓘWe tend to trust aesthetes’ judgments. They literally seem to be able to taste, hear, see, things we don’t. Our inability to taste or see or hear what they taste or see or hear is not counted as evidence against the reliability of their judgments.
      3. Therefore, the religious experiences of religious people justifies their religious beliefs.
      4. Therefore, religious experience of God justifies belief in God.
      • Gathered from C. F. Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford, 1989), pp. 67-70.
    • Perceptual Experience
      1. Perceptual experience is reliable.
      2. Religious experience has the same basic epistemic structure as perceptual experience.
         ⓘThe basic structure of perceptual experience includes (i) the perceiver, (ii) the object perceived, and (iii) the perceiver’s phenomenal experience of the object, or qualities thereof.
      3. If religious experience has the same basic epistemic structure as perceptual experience, religious experience is reliable.
         ⓘJust as reliable perceptual experience implies the object perceived is real and has the salient qualities it seems to have (i.e., the desk is brown, wooden, rectangular, hard, etc.), reliable religious experience implies the object perceived is real and has the salient qualities it seems to have (God is good, loving, powerful, beautiful, etc.).
      4. Therefore, religious experience is reliable.
      5. If religious experiences of God are reliable, then they justify belief in God.
      6. Therefore, religious experiences of God justify belief in God.
      • William Alston, Perceiving God (Cornell, 1991).
    • Established Doxastic Practice
      1. If p is formed on the basis of a socially established doxastic practice, p is prima facie justified.
         ⓘEstablished Doxastic Practice. Alston argues that the only non-circular way to demonstrate the reliability of perception is to simply accept its reliability as a matter of socially established practice. Other socially established doxastic practices include reliance on introspection, memory, rational intuition, and various kinds of reasoning. We all just accept that these practices are a source of (generally) true beliefs.

      1. If belief in God is formed on the basis of a socially established doxastic practice, belief in God is prima facie justified.
      2. Belief in God is formed on the basis of a socially established doxastic practice (namely, religious experience).
      3. Therefore, belief in God in God is prima facie justified.
      • William Alston, Perceiving God (Cornell, 1991).
    • Interpersonal Experience
      1. Beliefs about others (their existence, affections, attitudes, etc.) formed during close, personal encounters are
         rational.
         ⓘHallett gives the following example: “It was my first meeting with Mrs. M and my first visit to her apartment. Early in the visit, she had to change her baby daughter, after which she handed the child to her husband. At that moment the infant crowed with delight, and I caught a look of such tenderness in the mother’s eyes that I knew she loved her daughter. There was no mistaking that expression. Although looks that are so unmistakable may be relatively rare (I recall only a couple of others with similar distinctness on one occasion a look of intense pity, on another a look of utter terror), doubtless readers can recall similar experiences of their own.”
      2. Beliefs about God (His existence, affections, attitudes, etc.) are formed in a similar way as beliefs about others during close, personal encounters.
         ⓘ“In important respects, belief in God does and may resemble my belief that this mother loved her child. And that belief, I submit, was and today still is both rational and true.” (Hallett)
      3. If beliefs about God are formed in a similar way as beliefs about others during close, personal encounters, then beliefs about God formed in that way are rational.
      4. Beliefs about God (His existence, affections, attitudes, etc.) formed in a similar way as beliefs about others during close, personal encounters are rational.
      • Garth Hallett, A Middle Way to God (Oxford, 2000). See also C. F. Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience(Oxford, 1989), pp. 77-82. Paul Moser, Understanding Religious Experience (Cambridge, 2020), ch. 7.
    • Abductive
      • Consensus Gentium
        1. Many people (across diverse demographics, places, times, and traditions, etc.) have experiences which seem to them to be of God that are not subject to defeaters.
        2. If many people have experiences which seem to them to be of God that are not subject to defeaters, those experiences are probably veridical.
           ⓘWhat justifies this inference is something like inference to the best explanation.
        3. Therefore, those experiences are probably veridical.
        4. If those experiences are probably veridical, then probably, God exists.
        5. Therefore, probably, God exists.
        • Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge, 1993). Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief (Cornell, 1997). Harold Netland, Religious Experience and Knowledge of God (Baker Academic, 2022), pp. 239-248. Also relevant to premise (1) are so-called Christic visions. See Phillip Wiebe, Visions of Jesus (Oxford, 1997).
      • Ontomystical
        1. Mystics have experiences in which it seems to them God exists.
        2. If mystics have experiences in which it seems to them God exists, we should presume God possibly exists.
           ⓘIndian philosopher Śaṃkara said impossible things do not appear in any way. In positive form: Śaṃkara’s Principle: if it seems to S that p, we should presume p is possible. E.g., what seems real to you during an hallucination is not reason to think it is real, but is reason to think its possible.
        3. If we should presume God possibly exists, we should presume God exists.
           ⓘBecause the possible existence of God entails the actual existence of God. See ONTOLOGICAL > The Generic MOA.
        4. Therefore, we should presume God exists.
        • Alexander Pruss, “Śamkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001), pp. 111-120.
      • Fulfilled Promises
        1. God has promised that if one meets
           certain conditionsE.g., give up on one’s own righteousness, confess and repent of one’s sins, trust in God’s grace and mercy, etc.
           , God will bring about
           certain positive changes and experiencesE.g., experience a sense of peace and pardon from sin, assurance of the love of God, display virtues like patience, kindness, self-control, etc.
           in one’s life.
           ⓘFulfillment of Divine Promises.

        1. If many people who believe FDP meet those conditions and subsequently undergo those changes and experiences, that is significant evidence that FDP is in fact true.
           ⓘ“If many people have satisfied to a significant extent the conditions laid down for a sense of pardon from the guilt and power of sin, and if they, or a large proportion of them, then receive such a sense of pardon and power, this provides us with evidence for the truth of the claim that this promise was indeed made by a being with the wherewithal and the will to make good on that promise.” (Abraham).
        2. Many people who believe FDP meet those conditions and subsequently undergo those changes and experiences.
           ⓘ“I believe that the Christian autobiographical literature through the centuries, plus my own experience and the testimony of others, gives me an adequate basis for this assumption.” (Alston).
        3. Therefore, the fact that many people who believe FDP meet those conditions and subsequently undergo those changes and experiences is significant evidence that FDP is true.
        • William Alston, “The Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief,” in Radcliffe and White (eds.), Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief (Open Court, 1993), pp. 1-34. William Abraham, Aldersgate and Athens (Baylor, 2010), pp. 6-21. Michael Rota, Taking Pascal’s Wager (IVP, 2016), chs. 13-15. Harold Netland, Religious Experience and Knowledge of God (Baker Academic, 2022), pp. 248-258.
      • Other Spirits
        1. If there is good evidence for the existence of other spirits (e.g., angels and demons) postulated by Judeo-Christian theism, that is good evidence for the truth of Judeo-Christian theism.
        2. Many people have experiences which seem to them to be of those spirits that are not subject to defeaters.
        3. If many people have experiences which seem to them to be of those spirits that are not subject to defeaters, those experiences are good evidence for the existence of those spirits.
           ⓘWhat justifies this inference is something like inference to the best explanation.
        4. Therefore, those experiences are good evidence for the existence of those spirits.
        5. Therefore, those experiences are good evidence for the truth of Judeo-Christian theism.
        • Phillip Wiebe, God and Other Spirits (Oxford, 2004). On philosophical augments for the existence of demons, see also Shandon Guthrie, Gods of this World (Pickwick, 2018).
      • Near-Death Experiences
        1. If there is no good naturalistic explanation of some theistic
           NDEsAn experience one reports upon reviving from a period of clinical death (no visible signs of life such as measurable heart or brain activity).
           ,
           theistic NDEstheistic NDEs are NDEs in which one experiences God or something in a theistic worldview, such as angels, heaven, or hell.
           are evidence for theism.
        2. There is no good naturalistic explanation of some theistic NDEs.
        3. Therefore, theistic NDEs are evidence for theism.
        • L. W. Bailey and J. Yates, The Near-Death Experience: A Reader (Routledge, 1996). Holden, et al (eds.), The Handbook of Near-Death Experiences: Thirty Years of Investigation (Praeger, 2009). J. M. Holden, The Self Does Not Die (IANDS, 2016). Gary Habermas, “Evidential Near-Death Experiences,” in Loose, et al. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (Blackwell, 2018), ch. 14.

• PRAGMATICPragmatic arguments appeal to practical, rather than evidential, considerations that support belief in, or commitment to, theism.

• Pascalian Wagers
  • Canonical
    1. For any person S, and alternatives α and β, available to S, if the expected utility of α exceeds that of β, S should choose α.
       ⓘThis is the Expectation Rule in decision theory.
    2. Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
       God carries more expected utility than does wagering against.
       ⓘEither because wagering for God is an action with infinite expected utility (Heaven), or because of the this-outweighing benefits of religious belief.
    3. Therefore, one should wager for God.
    • Pascal, Pensées. Outline adapted from Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006).
  • Indifference
    1. For any person S, and alternatives α and β, available to S, if the expected utility of α exceeds that of β, S should choose α.
       ⓘThis is the Expectation Rule in decision theory.
    2. Given that the existence of God is as likely as not, the expected utility of
       Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
       God vastly exceeds that of wagering against.
       ⓘThe Indifference Rule in decision theory: assume each option is equiprobable and employ the Expectation Rule.
    3. Therefore, one should wager for God.
    • Pascal, Pensées. Outline adapted from Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006).
  • Weak Dominance
    1. For any person S, if one of the alternatives, α, available to S has an outcome better than the outcomes of the other available alternatives, and never an outcome worse than the others, S should choose α.
       ⓘThis is the Weak Dominance Rule in decision theory.
    2. Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
       God is better than wagering against God, whether God exists or not.
    3. Therefore, one should wager for God.
    • Pascal, Pensées. Outline adapted from Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006).
  • Strong Dominance
    1. For any person S, if among the alternatives available to S, the outcomes of one alternative, α, are better than those of the other available alternatives, S should choose α.
       ⓘThis is the Strong Dominance Rule in decision theory.
    2. Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
       God is better than wagering against God, whether God exists or not.
    3. Therefore, one should wager for God.
    • Pascal, Pensées. Outline adapted from Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006).
  • Maximin Wager
    1. Choose that action the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the other alternative actions.
       ⓘThe Maximin Rule in decision theory.
    2. The worst outcome of
       Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
       God is superior to the worst outcome of wagering against God.
       ⓘThe worst possible outcome of wagering against God being Hell.
    3. Therefore, one should wager for God.
    • Discussed in Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006), pp. 31ff.
  • Jamesian Wagers
    • James
      1. If belief in God is a
         genuine optionSomething is a genuine option when it’s (i) live: the belief is a real epistemic option for you, (ii) momentous: the belief is very important for how you live, probably irreversible once settled, and (iii) forced: you cannot suspend judgment on the belief.
         and has more benefits than costs, belief in God is rationally permissible even if there is insufficient evidence for God’s existence.
      2. Wagering forTo “wager for” α could mean (i) believing α, (ii) acting or behaving as if α, (iii) inculcating belief that α, (iv) attempt to inculcate belief that α, (v) accepting that α, or (vi) committing oneself to α.
         God carries more expected utility than does wagering against.
         ⓘEither because wagering for God is an action with infinite expected utility (Heaven), or because of the this-outweighing benefits of religious belief.
      3. Belief in God is a genuine option and has more benefits than costs.
      4. Therefore, belief in God is rationally permissible even if there is insufficient evidence for God’s existence.
      • William James, The Will to Believe. Excellent discussion is Jeff Jordan, “The Wager and William James,” in Bartha and Pasternack (eds.), Pascal’s Wager (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 101-120.
    • Betty
      1. For any two incompatible sets of beliefs A and B, if A produces more good for those who accept A than B does for those who accept B (all other things being equal), then A is more likely true than B.
         ⓘ“If clients who follow the advice of Stockbroker A consistently make more money than clients who follow Stockbroker B, then A's advice must reflect reality better than B's. … If explorers who believe the world is round make more discoveries than those who believe it is flat, then the round-world theory is closer to the truth than the flat-world theory. … If habitual truth-speakers are happier and more prosperous on the whole than habitual liars, then truth-speaking would reflect a moral law that it would be unwise to ignore. But if liars are more prosperous and happy on the whole, then it would be the other way round. … A person's success and happiness are based to a very great degree on his or her ability to grasp reality, and a person's lack of success and loss of happiness are based to a very great degree on his or her failure to grasp reality.”
      2. More good comes to people living out a set of religious beliefs R that foster tolerance, especially including belief in some form of divine reality, than out of an opposing set of purely secular beliefs S.
         ⓘBetty appeals to the “social sciences, including scientific pollsters, and to the medical sciences” that show a correlation between religiosity and well-being in support of (2).
      3. Therefore, R is more likely true than S.
      • L. Stafford Betty, “Going Beyond James: A Pragmatic Argument for God’s Existence” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49/2 (2001), pp. 69-84.
    • Jordan
      1. For any person S making a forced decision under uncertainty, if one of the alternatives, α, has an outcome as good as the best outcomes of the other available alternatives, and never an outcomes worse than the worst outcomes of the other alternatives, and, excluding the best outcomes and worst outcomes, has only outcomes better than the outcomes of the other alternatives, then S should choose α.
         ⓘThis is what Jordan calls the Next Best Thing Rule, a cousin of the Weak Dominance Rule in decision theory.
      2. Believing in God has an outcome better than the other available alternatives is naturalism is true.
         ⓘRelevant here are empirical studies on benefits of religious belief, such as longer life expectancy, stabler marriages and families, more social support and contacts higher self-esteem, happier, more optimistic and hopeful, greater sense of meaning and purpose in life, and greater sexual satisfaction.
      3. The best outcomes of believing in God are as good as the best outcomes of the other available alternatives, and the worst outcomes of believing in God are no worse than those of the other available alternatives.
      4. Theism has an outcome as good as the best outcomes of other alternatives, and never an outcome worse than the worst outcomes of the other alternatives, and, excluding the best outcomes and the worst outcomes, theism has only outcomes better than the outcomes of the other alternatives.
      5. Therefore, one should believe in God.
      • Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006).
    • Hybrid Wagers
      • Rota
        1. If Christianity has at least a 50% chance of being true, it is rational to commit to Christianity.
           ⓘBecause of the benefits of that commitment, whether it’s true or not. If true, benefits of commitment include being more likely to: obtain eternal life, bring joy to God and others, benefit from divine aid, feel God’s love and presence, and bring others to salvation. Even if not true, empirical studies indicate benefits of commitment include longer life expectancy, stabler marriages and families, more social support and contacts higher self-esteem, happier, more optimistic and hopeful, greater sense of meaning and purpose in life, and greater sexual satisfaction.
        2. Christianity has at least a 50% chance of being true.
           ⓘSee: arguments for the truth of Christian theism.
        3. Therefore, it is rational to commit to Christianity.
        • Michael Rota, Taking Pascal’s Wager (IVP Academic, 2016). For more on empirical studies on benefits of religious belief, see Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager (Oxford, 2006), pp. 90ff. Justin McBrayer, “The Wager Renewed: Believing in God is Good for You,” Science, Religion and Culture 1/3, pp. 130–140.
      • Jackson & Rogers
        1. You should maximize expected value.
           ⓘBasic principle of decision theory.
        2. Wagering on the most probable religion that posits an infinite afterlife maximizes expected value.
           ⓘEven if atheism is the most intrinsically probable view, a religion which posits an infinite afterlife will swamp atheism’s expected value.
        3. Therefore, you should wager on the most probable religion that posits an infinite afterlife.
        4. Christianity is the most probable religion that posits an infinite afterlife.
           ⓘSee: arguments for the truth of Christian theism.
        5. Therefore, you should wager on Christianity.
        • Liz Jackson and Andrew Rogers, “Salvaging Pascal’s Wager,” Philosophia Christi 21/1 (2019), pp. 59-84.
      • Rational Devotion
        1. The greater the good, the more rational it is to hope for it, so long as it is believed possible.
        2. The more rational it is to hope for something, the more rational it is to devote your life to it.
           ⓘTwo examples of P1 and P1 applied: 1. Suppose we’re searching for a missing girl suspected to have drowned. It’d be a great good if she hadn’t. I believe it’s possible though unlikely that she’s still alive, so it’s rational to hope she’s still alive, and so rational to keep searching for her. 2. Suppose nuclear war seems immanent. It’d be a really great good if averted. I believe it’s possible to avert it, though unlikely. So, so it’s very rational to hope it’ll be averted, and so very rational to keep trying to avert it.
        3. If S believes x is possible and x is the greatest good, it is maximally rational for S to hope for x, and so maximally rational for S to devote S’s life to x, regardless of how improbable x is.
           ⓘP3 is what we get when we maximize the possible good. Rationality of hoping for and devotion to it becomes maximal, regardless of how improbable it is.

        1. S believes God possibly exists and is the greatest good.
        2. Therefore, it is maximally rational for S to hope God exists, and so maximally rational for S to devote S’s life to God, regardless of how improbable God’s existence is.
        • Richard Creel, “Agatheism: A Justification of the Rationality of Devotion to God,” Faith and philosophy 10/1 (1993), pp. 33-48.
      • Moral Benefits
        • Adams
          1. If a belief is
             demoralizingA belief is demoralizing when it weakens or deteriorates moral motivation.
             , it is morally undesirable.
          2. If a belief is morally undesirable, there is moral advantage in believing the opposite.
          3. It is demoralizing to believe that there is no
             moral orderThere is moral order if there is a balance of good over evil in the universe, and our moral acts make a significant different to that balance.
             .
             ⓘBecause we would have to regard it as very likely that the history of the universe will not be good on the whole, no matter what we do.
          4. Therefore, it is morally undesirable to believe that there is no moral order.
          5. Therefore, there is moral advantage in believing there is moral order.
          6. Theism provides the most adequate theory of moral order.
          7. If theism provides the most adequate theory of a moral order, there is a moral advantage in accepting theism.
          8. Therefore, there is a moral advantage in accepting theism.
          • Robert Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief,” in Delaney (ed.), Rationality and Religious Belief (Notre Dame, 1979), pp. 116-140.
        • Quinn
          1. If Y is morally desirable and doing X helps bring about Y, one has a prima facie moral permission to do X.
          2. It is morally desirable that I and/or society become morally better and believing in God helps bring that about.
          3. Therefore, I have a prima facie moral permission to believe in God.
          • Richard Gale finds this argument in William James, and ultimately rejects it. See his On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge, 1991). Philip Quinn defends it against Gale’s criticisms in “Gale on a Pragmatic Argument for Religious Belief” Philo 6/1 (2003), pp. 59-66.
        • Byerly
          1. If
             accepting God’s loveAccepting God’s love involves (i) a cognitive commitment to God’s attending to, understanding, and caring for them, seeing good things in life as expressions of God’s love for them, and so on, and (ii) a positive affective orientation towards that love.
             increases one’s chances of developing moral virtues and becoming a better person (and there aren’t comparable drawbacks to doing so), then it is rationally permissible to cognitively commit oneself to God’s existence as part of an effort to accept God’s love.
             ⓘAccepting God’s love does not mean believing God’s love—and by implication, God—exists. Rather, it involves a pattern of cognitive attitudes (e.g., believing, assuming, accepting, assenting) and behaviors directed towards God as an intentional object, which can be displayed whether or not there in fact is a God for them to be directed towards.
          2. Accepting God’s love increases one’s chances of developing moral virtues and becoming a better person (and there aren’t comparable drawbacks to doing so).
             ⓘByerly marshals empirical evidence in favor of (2), indicating that maintaining a secure attachment to God (roughly, confidence in God’s availability and support when necessary)—and so accepting God’s love—is positively related to mental health for believers but also agnostics, and as such may contribute to indirect virtue development for agnostics..
          3. Therefore, it is rationally permissible to cognitively commit oneself to God’s existence as part of an effort to accept God’s love.
          • T. Ryan Byerly, “The Transformative Power of Accepting God’s Love,” Religious Studies 58 (2022), p. 831-845.
        • Copan & Wolf
          1. If a religion’s central teachings dramatically transform people and the world for the better, it is rational to commit to that religion.
          2. Christianity’s central teachings have, and continue to, dramatically transform people the world for the better.
             ⓘEarly Christians put into practice the belief that all humans are created in the image of God, following Jesus’ example and admonition to love your neighbor as yourself in such a way that Christianity became a catalyst for change throughout the whole world. It inspired belief that all humans have inherent worth; changed the way people saw and treated widows, the homeless, the poor, social outcasts; ended gladiatorial blood sport; elevated the status of women; established charities, hospitals, more humane systems of government; promoted education; and was the inspiration that drove scientific progress.
          3. Therefore, it’s rational to commit to Christianity.
          • Paul Copan and Thom Wolf, “Another Dimension of the Moral Argument: The Voice of Jesus and the Historical Fruits of the Christian Faith,” in Rasmussen and Vallier (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists (Routledge, 2020), ch. 10. For more on Christianity’s impact on the world, see Rodney Stark, The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success (Random House, 2006). Nick Spencer, The Evolution of the West: How Christianity has Shaped our Values (SPCK, 2016).

• METAPHYSICALMetaphysical arguments appeal to certain metaphysical facts, relations, and entities as support for theism.

• Abstracta Generally
  • Augustinian Realism
    1. Abstract objectsThings like properties, propositions, relations, numbers, sets, functions, logical laws, possible worlds, essences, fictional objects, etc. exist.
    2. If abstract objects exist, they are either mind-independent objects or mind-dependent objects.
    3. Abstract objects are mind-dependent objects.
    4. If abstract objects are mind-dependent objects, they are dependent on at least one necessarily existent, infinite mind.
       ⓘBecause abstract objects are nonphysical, necessarily existent, and infinite in number.
    5. Therefore, there is at least one necessarily existent, infinite mind.
    • There are many variations of this broadly-outlined argument, which is often ultimately attributed to Augustine. Defenses include: Robert Adams, “Divine Necessity,” The Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), pp. 741-752. E. J. Lowe, “Naturalism, Theism, and Objects of Reason,” Philosophia Christi, 15/1 (2013), pp. 35-45. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius, 2017), ch. 3. Greg Welty, “The Conceptualist Argument,” in Ruloff and Horban (eds.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 217-233.
  • Abstracta to Necessary Concreta
    • Lowe
      1. Some necessary
         abstract beingsx is an abstract being = df x does not exist in space or time. exist.
      2. All abstract beings are dependent beings.
      3. All dependent beings depend for their existence on independent beings.
      4. No contingent being can explain the existence of a necessary being.
      5. The existence of any dependent being needs to be explained.
      6. Dependent beings of any kind cannot explain their own existence.
      7. The existence of dependent beings can only be explained by beings on which they depend for their existence.
      8. Therefore, all abstract beings depend for their existence on
         concrete beingsx is a concrete being = df x exists in space and time, or at least in time.. (2, 3, defs)
      9. Therefore, the existence of necessary abstract beings needs to be explained. (1, 2, 5)
      10. Therefore, the existence of necessary abstract beings can only be explained by concrete beings. (8, 4, 6, 7).
      11. Therefore, the existence of necessary abstract beings is explained by one or more necessary concrete beings. (4, 9, 10)
      12. Therefore, a necessary concrete being exists. (11)
      • E. J. Lowe, “A New Modal Version of the Ontological Argument,” in Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today (Ontos Verlag, 2012), ch. 8.
    • Pruss & Rassmussen
      1. Necessarily, there is an abstract object.
      2. Necessarily, if there is an abstract object, there is a concrete object.
      3. Possibly, there are no contingent concrete objects.
      4. Therefore, possibly, there is an abstract object and no contingent concrete objects. (1, 3)
      5. Therefore, possibly, there is a concrete object and no contingent concrete objects. (2, 4)
      6. Therefore, possibly, there is a necessary concrete object.
      7. Therefore, there is a necessary concrete object. (6, S5)
      • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), ch. 7.
  • Leftow’s Global Economy Argument
    1. We should accept the best theory of abstracta.
    2. The best theory of abstracta will secure the virtues of both anti-realism (economic) and realism (necessity and objectivity).
    3. Only theism can secure the virtues of both anti-realism and realism about abstracta.
       ⓘTheism secures the virtues of both views, since all abstracta are reducible to the objective nature and activities of a single, necessary, concrete being—God.
    4. Therefore, theism provides the best theory of abstracta.
    5. Therefore, we should accept theism.
    • Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford, 2012).
  • Propositions
    1. PropositionsA proposition is the truth-bearing content of a sentence.
       are distinctively thought-like.
       ⓘSmith takes propositions to be effects of mental causes (propositional attitudes). Anderson and Welty argue propositions are intentional. For “Aristotle is wise” to be true, it must be an intentional object of or about its constituents (Aristotle, wisdom). Davis argues the constituents of propositions are best construed as ideas (e.g., the idea of Aristotle, the idea of wisdom), and as such need a mind not just to host them but to properly arrange them so as to accurately represent reality, i.e., being true. Keller argues that propositions are essentially representational, but representationality ultimately derives from agents.
    2. The best explanation of propositions being distinctively thought-like is that they are thoughts.
    3. Therefore, probably, propositions are thoughts.
    4. If propositions are thoughts, they are the thoughts of a necessary, infinite mind.
       ⓘSince propositions are necessary, and there are an infinite number of them.
    5. Therefore, probably, propositions are the thoughts of a necessary, infinite mind.
    • Quentin Smith, “A Conceptualist Argument for God’s Existence,” Faith and Philosophy, 11/1 (1994), pp. 38-49. James Anderson and Greg Welty, “The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic,” Philosophia Christi, 13/2 (2011), pp. 321-338. Richard Davis, “God and the Platonic Horde: A Defense of Limited Conceptualism,” Philosophia Christi, 13/2 (2011), pp. 289-303. Lorraine Keller, “Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions,” Erkenntnis 82/4 (2017), pp. 929-946. Keller, “The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness): Propositions Supernaturalized,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 11-28.
  • Universals
    1. If the conjunction of
       moderate realismModerate realism is the view that universals are real, but only insofar as they are either present in a mind as universal ideas, or realized by/instantiated as individual entities.
       ,
       dispositionalismDispositionalism is the view that at least some fundamental properties of physical objects are dispositions (capacities, causal powers).
       , and a view of the instantiation relation as
       two-valuedi.e., all universals are either instanted or uninstantiated.
       is true, then theism is probably true.
       ⓘThe most plausible option is that they are universal ideas in a necessarily existent mind, since “in order to really play an effective explanatory role for all possible scenarios involving dispositions toward uninstantiated universals, this mind will have to exist in all possible worlds containing such dispositions, and have cognition of all the relevant universals. ... Plug in the traditional notion of God as creator and designer of physical objects, including their causal powers, and we then have another ready-made tie between the content of dispositions and the content of divine ideas.”
    2. The conjunction of moderate realism, dispositionalism, and a view of the instantiation relation as two-valued is true.
    3. Therefore, theism is probably true.
    • Travis Dumsday, “A Cosmological Argument from Moderate Realism,” Heythrop Journal 61/5 (2020), pp. 732-736. See also Travis Dumsday, Dispositionalism and the Metaphysics of Science (Cambridge, 2021), ch. 2.
  • Sets
    1. Sets exist and have a certain nature: they are (i) non-self-membered, (ii) have their members essentially, and (iii) collectively form an iterated structure.
    2. Either
       set-theoretic realismSTR is the view that sets exist independently of mind.
       is true or
       activismActivism is the view that sets are the product of ‘intellective activity’.
       is true.
    3. Activism explains the existence and nature of sets better than set-theoretic realism ((iii) in particular).
       ⓘThe iterated structure goes only so “high.” It seems to have an arbitrarily high ceiling, if you will. This fact seems to fit better with activism than STR, since activism has the resources to explain that arbitrariness in terms of an agent’s choice. It goes only so high because that’s just all that was produced by intellective activity.
    4. Therefore, the existence and nature of sets confirms activism over set-theoretic realism.
    5. The best explanation of activism is that there is an infinite intellect.
       ⓘThere are just too many sets, and sets too large, for them to be the collections of anything by an infinite intellect.
    6. Therefore, the existence and nature of sets confirms the existence of an infinite intellect.
    • Christopher Menzel, “The Argument from Collections,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 29-58.
  • Logic
    1. Logic is
       maximally infinitaryAny number (finite or infinite) of logical formulas can be conjoined or disjoined; these formulas can contain quantifiers over any number (finite or infinite) of variables; and as a consequence they can express statements such as ‘there are k many’ not just for finite cardinals k (0, 1, 2, ...) but infinite ones as well.
       .
    2. The best explanation of logic being maximally infinitary is theism.
       ⓘThis is because logic and God share the same salient properties. In particular, Paseau is impressed with the similarities between logic and the Christian concept of the Logos: “The infinite Logos transcends human understanding and is revealed to us in part. Strikingly, recent advances tend to show the same is true of logic. Logic structures all truths, is highly infinitary, and can only be partially grasped by finite beings.”
    3. Therefore, logic being maximally infinitary is evidence for theism.
    • A. C. Paseau, “Logos, Logic and Maximal Infinity,” Religious Studies 58/2 (2022), pp. 420-435.
  • Facts
    1. Facts exist and are unities of constituents.
       ⓘ‘a is F’, ‘a’s being F’ is a unity of a, F-ness.
    2. Facts can be unities of constituents only if there is an external fact-unifer.
       ⓘVallicella argues that Theories that do not appeal to an external unifier—whether some further constituent, or just the fact itself—are incoherent.
    3. Some fact or other exists in every possible world.
    4. If some fact or other exists in every possible world, there must exist an external fact-unifer in every possible world.
    5. Therefore, there exists an external fact-unifier in every possible world.
    6. The only thing that can be an external fact-unifier in every possible world is a mind.
       ⓘAn external fact-unifer cannot be a material object, since not all worlds have material objects. Nor can it be an abstract object, because AOs lack the power to unify anything.
    7. Therefore, a fact-unifying mind exists in every possible world.
    • William Vallicella, “From Facts to God: An Onto-Cosmological Argument,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 48/3 (2000), pp. 157-181.
  • Contingents
    1. All contingent beings are composite and temporal.
    2. There is nothing intrinsic to contingent beings that explains what holds them together through time.
    3. That which explains what holds contingent beings together through time cannot be other contingent beings.
    4. Therefore, that which explains what holds contingent beings together through time must be a necessary, incomposite, atemporal, sustaining cause.
    5. Therefore, there is a necessary, incomposite, atemporal, sustaining cause of all of contingent beings.
    • David Braine, The Reality of Time and the Existence of God (Oxford, 1988).
  • Wholes
    1. All wholes are made by an intelligent agent.
       ⓘJustified by induction of paradigmatic cases of wholes (e.g., pots, palaces, chariots). What about trees, crystals, planets, etc.? Things can have more than one type of explanation at once. An explanation of e.g., crystals that refers exclusively to natural causes will suffice only if the smallest wholes that can be found in crystals can be explained naturalistically. But scientists don’t know what the smallest wholes even are, much less how to explain them.
    2. Some wholes are not made by an embodied agent.
       ⓘBodies are made up of the smallest wholes, atoms. There is therefore no body that an agent that makes atoms could have. Embodied agents are themselves wholes. But wholes can’t explain other wholes ad infinitum. So, there must be an agent that is not embodied.
    3. Therefore, some wholes made by an intelligent agent were not made by an embodied agent.
    4. Some wholes made by an intelligent, unembodied agent require that agent to be God-like.
       ⓘE.g., the smallest material wholes, the whole cosmos.
    5. Therefore, a God-like being exists.
    • J. Kronen and S. Menssen, “The Argument from Wholes: A Classical Hindu Design Argument for the Existence of God,” Faith and Philosophy 30/2 (2013), pp. 138-158.
  • Cosmos
    1. The unity of the cosmos requires explanation.
    2. If the unity of the cosmos is explained by something internal to it, it is explained either by (a) its parts or (b) by natural laws.
    3. The unity of cosmos cannot be explained by (a) its parts or (b) by natural laws.
       ⓘNot by its parts because the cosmos is prior to its parts. Not by natural laws because: Understood descriptively, laws are not causally efficacious. Understood prescriptively, laws themselves require explanation, and so cannot be the ultimate explanation of the unity of the cosmos.
    4. Therefore, the unity of the cosmos cannot be explained by something internal to it. (2, 3)
    5. Therefore, the unity of the cosmos must be explained by something external to it.
    6. Whatever external to the cosmos that explains its unity must be timeless, immaterial, powerful, and plausibly a mind.
    • Paulo Juarez, “From the Unity of the World to God: A Teleo-Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence,” Scientia et Fides 5/2 (2017), pp. 283-303.
  • Geometry
    1. GEOMETRYLet “GEOMETRY” designate a specification of the complete spatiotemporal geometry of the entire cosmos or multiverse. GEOMETRY is simply the biggest “shape”.
       is a geometric state.
    2. Every geometric state is dependent.
       ⓘConsider the shape of a chair. The instantiation of that shape depends on other, prior things and conditions. It doesn’t instantiate itself. If some shape depends on something for its instantiation, all do. There’s no relevant difference between the shape of a chair and the shape of anything else.
    3. Therefore, GEOMETRY is dependent. (1, 2)
    4. GEOMETRY cannot depend on any state featuring only things that have a geometry.
       ⓘOn pain of circularity, since all things that have a geometry are already included in GEOMETRY.
    5. GEOMETRY cannot depend on any state featuring only non-concrete (non-causal) things.
       ⓘGEOMETRY is a state of spatiotemporal positions of concrete, material objects. Abstract things, like properties, relations, and sets, lack the power to bring about material objects that instantiate GEOMETRY.
    6. Therefore, GEOMETRY depends on a state featuring at least one geometry-less concrete thing (3-5).
    • Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
  • Limits
    1. Every
       limitA property P is a limit = Necessarily, whatever has P is limited in some positive respect. (e.g., being incapable of thinking coherently is a limit).
       is explicable.
       ⓘE.g., the size of the Earth is limited, and is explained by, among other things, its mass.
    2. The property having limits is itself a limit.
    3. Therefore, having limits is explicable. (1, 2)
    4. If having limits is explicable, then something could lack limits.
       ⓘThe explanation of limited things cannot itself be a limited thing, lest the explanation be circular, and therefore not explanatory at all.
    5. Therefore, something could lack limits. (3, 4)
    6. If something could lack limits, then something must be perfect.
       ⓘ“By definition, only something perfect could lack limits. Whatever is less than perfect has some limit in some positive respect, whereas whatever is perfect is purely positive—and so has no limits in any positive respect.”
    7. Therefore, something must be perfect (i.e., God). (5, 6)
    • Joshua Rasmussen, How Reason Can Lead to God (IVP, 2019).
  • Possibility
    1. Modalities are grounded in powers.
       ⓘLeftow argues that there are insuperable problems with grounding modalities in either Platonic or Meinongian objects. But grounding modalities in powers is ontologically economic (hey are reducible to something concrete, actual, and existing) and explanatory (answers what makes something possible).
    2. Modalities can be grounded powers only if they are grounded in the powers of an omnipotent being.
       ⓘThe “true modality” is absolute or metaphysical possibility, which ranges across all worlds, not just natural objects.
    3. Therefore, modalities are grounded in the powers of an omnipotent being. (1, 2)
    • Brian Leftow, “The Argument from Possibility,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 406-416.
  • Applicability of Mathematics
    1. The applicability of mathematics to the physical world requires explanation.
    2. The best explanation of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is that God modeled the physical world in accordance with mathematical structures.
    3. Therefore, the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is evidence of God’s existence.
    • Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13/1 (1960), pp. 1-14. Mark Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Harvard, 1998). William Lane Craig, “God and the Applicability of Mathematics,” in Ruloff and Horban (eds.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 195-216.

• NOMOLOGICALNomological arguments appeal to the ontological status and structure of the laws of nature as support for theism.

• Peterson
  1. Natural laws exist and are (a)
     transcendentThings conform to laws. Laws are not mere descriptions of things.
     yet (b)
     immanentLaws are somehow “in” things. Cf. dispositional properties.
     .
     ⓘAristotelian realism cannot explain laws being transcendent, and Platonic realism cannot explain laws being immanent. But laws being grounded in God explains both, because God is himself a transcendent yet immanent being. Laws are reflections of God’s conforming all things to his mind and will.
  2. Natural laws can be (a) transcendent yet (b) immanent only if they are grounded in a transcendent yet immanent being.
     ⓘAristotelian realism cannot explain laws being transcendent, and Platonic realism cannot explain laws being immanent. But laws being grounded in God explains both, because God is himself a transcendent yet immanent being. Laws are reflections of God’s conforming all things to his mind and will.
  3. Therefore, natural laws are grounded a transcendent yet immanent being.
  • John Peterson, “Law and Thomistic Exemplarism,” The Thomist, 60/1 (1996), pp. 81-108. Peterson’s argument is a nice summation of a common Scholastic argument.

• Ratzsch
  1. Laws of nature are (a) prior to that which they describe, and (b) subjunctive in structure.
     ⓘLaws are universally quantified subjunctives like “For any x, if x is copper, were x heated, x would expand.” But they are not merely universal generalizations based on the behavior or dispositions of things like copper, for they are true regardless of whether copper (say) exists. If they were, then laws would not be explanatory in the right way; we might still ask why copper expands when heated, or why copper has the dispositional properties it does—which would require appeal to just another law of nature, which is circular.
  2. The best explanation of why laws are this way is that they are counterfactuals of freedom.
     ⓘBecause counterfactuals of freedom are also this way. Just identify the two.
  3. Therefore, probably, laws of nature are counterfactuals of freedom.
  4. Laws of nature can be counterfactuals of freedom only if they are counterfactuals of freedom of a transcendent agent with an absolutely stable character who governs the relevant parts of reality.
  5. Therefore, probably, laws of nature are counterfactuals of freedom of a transcendent agent with an absolutely stable character who governs the relevant parts of reality.
  • Del Ratzsch, “Nomo(theo)logical Necessity,” Faith and Philosophy 4/4 (1987), pp. 383-402.

• Foster
  1. Induction is justified.
  2. Induction is justified only if there is genuine regularity of nature.
  3. There can be genuine regularity of nature only if there are natural laws governing nature.
  4. Therefore, there are natural laws governing nature.
  5. The best explanation of there being natural laws governing nature is if God created them and imposes them on nature.
     ⓘFoster agrees with much of David Armstrong’s account of the laws of nature, but argues Armstrong’s account suffers from insuperable objections that can be overcome only if laws are creations of a supernatural being who then imposes them on the universe to ensure its regularity.
  6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
  • John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God (Oxford, 2004).

• Swinburne
  1. The best naturalistic theory of the laws of nature are that they are determination relations between properties.
  2. If laws of nature are determination relations between properties, there are two fundamentally different kinds of causation—event causation and agent causation.
     ⓘThis is because laws of nature conceived of as determination relations between properties can explain event causation but not agent causation. But the latter is real, and can’t be reduced to the former.
  3. All else being equal, we should prefer simpler theories to more complex theories.
  4. If laws of nature are regularities imposed on nature by God, there is just one kind of causation—agent causation.
     ⓘEvent causation can be reduced to agent causation, however, so long as the agent in question is God.
  5. Therefore, all else being equal, we should prefer the theistic theory of laws of nature to the naturalistic theory.
  • Richard Swinburne, “Relations Between Universals, or Divine Laws?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84/2 (2006), pp. 179-189.

• Monton
  1. We’re justified in believing induction is reliable.
  2. We’re justified in believing induction is reliable only if we’re justified in believing the universe started in a low-entropy state.
     ⓘBecause a low-entropy state is highly-ordered. A high-entropy state would be chaotic.
  3. We’re justified in believing the universe started in a low-entropy state only if theism is true.
     ⓘIf naturalism is true, it’s more probable that you’re a Boltzmann brain than that the universe started in a low-entropy state. But naturalists don’t believe we’re Boltzmann brains. Further, God would want our judgements about reality to be generally reliable and true, so provides reason for us to trust induction.
  4. Therefore, we’re justified in believing induction is reliable only if theism is true.
  5. Therefore, theism is true.
  • Bradley Monton, “Atheistic Induction by Boltzmann Brains,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 184-197.

• Gordon
  1. There is genuine ontic indeterminacy.
     ⓘGordon says this is an indisputable result of quantum mechanics. So there are states that have no physical or causal explanation.
  2. Material objects are ontologically complete.
     ⓘThat is, they are not ontologically incomplete; there are no “gaps” in their existence akin to missing code in a computer program. Gordon argues that (2) follows from the PSR.
  3. If there is genuine ontic indeterminacy, material objects can be ontologically complete only if something more fundamental than matter completes them.
  4. Therefore, material objects can be ontologically complete only if something more fundamental completes them.
  5. Therefore, something more fundamental than matter completes material objects.
  6. The only thing that could more fundamental than matter that could complete material objects is a God-like mind.
  7. Therefore, a God-like mind exists.
  • Bruce Gordon, “The Necessity of Sufficiency: The Argument from the Incompleteness of Nature,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 417-445.

• Orr
  1. If there are causal powers, there are uninstantiated states of affairs.
  2. There are causal powers.
  3. Therefore, there are uninstantiated states of affairs.
  4. Theism is the best explanation of uninstantiated states of affairs.
     ⓘTheism—and, in particular, God’s mind—provides a better explanation than naturalism or platonism for the fact that the causal powers that ground lawlike regularities are wholly or partly directed towards other properties that are not yet or ever instantiated.
  5. Therefore, theism is the best explanation of causal powers.
  6. Laws of nature are grounded in causal powers.
  7. Therefore, theism is the best explanation of laws of nature.
  • James Orr, “No God, No Powers,” International Philosophical Quarterly 59/4 (2019), pp. 411-426. See also Orr, The Mind of God and The Works of Nature: Laws and Powers in Naturalism, Platonism, and Classical Theism (Peeters, 2019). Orr’s argument for (5) is similar to Travis Dumsday’s in“A Cosmological Argument from Moderate Realism,” Heythrop Journal 61/5 (2020), pp. 732-736. For outline, see METAPHYSICAL > Universals.

• Hildebrand & Metcalf
  1. The best theory of lawlike regularities is one that explains why they have the structure they do.
  2. HumeanThe distribution of properties in our world is simply a brute fact: a basic feature of our metaphysics for which there is no metaphysical explanation.
     theories,
     primitivistLaws are primitive entities in our ontology. The locution ‘it is a law that’ functions as a modal operator governed by the following axiom: necessarily, for all statements p, ˹it is a law that p˺ entails p.
     theories, and
     property-basedLaws are statements involving modal relations between natural properties like universals, dispositions, or natural kinds.
     theories cannot explain why lawlike regularizes have the structure they do.
     ⓘHumean theories cannot explain why there are any regularities at all. Primitivist theories are too permissive: they cannot explain why laws produce the regularities we observe; other distributions of events are just as likely. Property-based theories are too restrictive: many regularities we observe are more sophisticated than what natural properties can produce.
  3. Divine voluntaristThere is an intelligent being that has the power to intentionally control the distribution of properties in our world— that is, whether there are regularities or mere patterns or no patterns at all.
     theories can explain why lawlike regularizes have the structure they do.
     ⓘ“It has more structure than Primitivism, since it countenances God’s power and God’s will. But it appears to have less structure—and more flexibility—than property-based theories, since it seems that any regularity that scientists could posit could be a regularity that God could will.”
  4. Therefore, the best theory of lawlike regularizes is divine voluntarism.
  • Tyler Hildebrand & Thomas Metcalf, “The Nomological Argument for the Existence of God,” Nous 56/2 (2022), pp. 442-472. See also their more accessible presentation, “The Nomological Argument for the Existence of God,” Big Think, May, 2021. For similar argument, see Robin Collins, “God and the Laws of Nature,” Philo 12/2 (2009), pp. 142-171.

• AXIOLOGICALAxiological arguments appeal to non-moral kinds of value as support for theism.

• The Fourth Way
  1. Things are more or less good, true, noble, etc.
  2. Things are more or less good, true, noble, etc. only if they are so by resemblance to something maximally good, true, noble, etc.
  3. Therefore, there is something maximally good, true, noble, etc.
  4. If there is something maximally good, true, noble, etc., it is God.
  5. Therefore, God exists.
  • Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2.3. SCG I, 13. A nice updated defense is David Alexander, God, Goodness, and Evil (Bloomsbury, 2012), ch. 5

• The Monologion Proof
  1. The Good‘The Good’ here refers to some individual entity, such that to be a good thing is to stand in some relation R to it – as Anselm puts it, ‘some one thing through which all good things whatsoever are good’.
     exists.
     ⓘThe Good is itself good, since everything that exists is good to some degree.
  2. The Good, if it exists, is itself a supremely good thing.
     ⓘThe Good is best thought of as the paradigm good that other good things resemble to some degree, just as an original painting is a paradigm that replicas resemble more or less. But nothing can resemble a paradigm more than itself. Hence, nothing “could possibly be greater than the Good itself, since this would amount to resembling the Good more than the Good resembles itself, which is absurd.”
  3. If a supremely good thing exists, God exists.
  4. Therefore, God exists.
  • Anselm, Monologion I-II. Christophe de Ray, “Why the Good is Supremely Good: A Defense of the Monologion Proof,” Religious Studies 58 (2022), pp. 715-731.

• Deontic Value
  • Axiarchism
    1. If x ought to exist, x exists.
       ⓘThe axiarchic principle is the metaphysical counterpart of the ethical principle ‘if S ought to do a, S can do a’. Some states of affairs ought to be and ought not be, just due to their value or disvalue. A thing’s value creates a presumption or a reason in favor of its existence.

    1. If God ought to exist, God exists.
    2. God ought to exist.
       ⓘAs a maximally good being, the state of affairs of God existing would be supremely valuable. Granted (1), then, there is a major presumption or a reason in favor of God’s existence; i.e., God ought to exist..
    3. Therefore, God exists.
    • Classic defense of the axiarchic principle is John Leslie, Value and Existence (Blackwell, 1979). For more explicit application to theism, see A. C. Ewing, “Two ‘Proofs’ of God’s Existence,” Religious Studies 1 (1966), pp. 29-46. Hugh Rice, God and Goodness (Oxford, 2000).
  • Modal Axiarchism
    1. If x ought to exist, x possibly exists.
       ⓘThis is a modal version of the axiarchic principle that if x ought to exist, x exists. Kordig cites MAP as an axiom of deontic logic.

    1. God ought to exist.
       ⓘWhatever is maximally perfect is deontically perfect. What is deontically perfect ought to exist. God is maximally perfect. So, God is deontically perfect. So, God ought to exist.
    2. Therefore, God possibly exists.
    3. If God possibly exists, God exists.
       ⓘSee ONTOLOGICAL > The Generic MOA.
    4. Therefore, God exists.
    • Carl Kordig, “A Deontic Argument for God’s Existence,” Nous 15/2 (1981), pp. 207-208. William Vallicella, “Does God Exist Because He Ought to Exist?” in Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs (De Gruyter, 2018), pp. 205–212.
  • Aesthetic Value
    • Aesthetic Sensibilities
      1. We have natural and sophisticated aesthetic sensibilities.
      2. That we have natural and sophisticated aesthetic sensibilities is more likely given theism than given naturalism.
         ⓘWhat we find beautiful goes far beyond, and sometimes contrary to, what might have once had survival value. This otherwise gratuitous and overdeveloped sense of the aesthetic would be expected if our cognitive faculties are the product of a being that also has aesthetic sensibilities.
      3. Therefore, that have natural and sophisticated aesthetic sensibilities is evidence for theism over naturalism.
      • Phillip Tallon, “The Mozart Argument and the Argument from Play and Enjoyment: The Theistic Argument from Beauty and Play,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 321-340. Jonathan Ashbach, “Rediscovering the Aesthetic Argument,” Philosophia Christi 23/2 (2021), pp. 291-312.
    • Objective Beauty
      1. There is objective beauty.
      2. Objective beauty is more likely given theism than naturalism.
      3. Therefore, objective beauty is evidence for theism over naturalism.
      • Phillip Tallon, “The Mozart Argument and the Argument from Play and Enjoyment: The Theistic Argument from Beauty and Play,” in Walls & Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 321-340. Doug Geivett and James Spiegel, “Beauty: A Troubling Reality for the Scientific Naturalist,” in Copan & Taliaferro (eds.), The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality (Lexington Books, 2019), pp. 141-157. A defense of objective beauty is Eddy Zamach, Real Beauty (Pennsylvania University Press, 1997).
    • Natural Beauty as Art
      1. Beautiful things are likely the product of aesthetic intent.
         ⓘThings that are not the product of aesthetic intent are rarely beautiful.
      2. The natural world is (in general) beautiful.
         ⓘFar from being rarely beautiful, the natural world is in general beautiful.
      3. Therefore, the natural world is likely the product of aesthetic intent.
      4. The natural world is likely the product of aesthetic intent only if there is a being with aesthetic intent that produced it.
      5. Therefore, it is likely that there is a being with aesthetic intent that produced the natural world.
      • F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1930). Extended defense of Tennant is Mark Wynn God and Goodness: A Natural Theological Perspective (Routlegde, 1999).
    • Natural Beauty as a Gift
      1. Natural beauty gives the resilient impression of being a gift.
         ⓘNatural beauty often inspires in us feelings of deep gratitude, and gratitude is the mental state in which we are impressed with the goodness of our having received this gift from this giver.
      2. If something gives the resilient impression of being a gift, we’re justified in believing it is a gift.
      3. Therefore, we’re justified in believing natural beauty is a gift.
      4. If natural beauty is a gift, it can only be the gift of a transcendent, benevolent giver.
      5. Therefore, we’re justified in believing there is a transcendent, benevolent giver.
      • Peter Forrest, God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism (Cornell, 1996). Ryan West and Adam Pelser, “Perceiving God Through Natural Beauty,” Faith and Philosophy 32/3 (2015), pp. 293-312.
    • Natural Beauty as Natural Sign
      1. Natural signs justify belief in the reality of that which they signify.
         ⓘE.g., the word “Dog” is a natural sign, signifying the concept ‘dog,’ which justifies belief in the reality of dogs.
      2. Natural beauty is a natural sign.
         ⓘWest and Pelser argue that natural beauty, as a natural sign, signifies divine attributes like wisdom, power, benevolence, and cosmic artistry/creativity.
      3. Natural beauty signifies concepts of and beliefs about God.
      4. Therefore, natural beauty justifies belief in the reality of God.
      • Ryan West and Adam Pelser, “Perceiving God Through Natural Beauty,” Faith and Philosophy 32/3 (2015), pp. 293-312.
    • Beauty in Mathematics
      1. Mathematical theories inspired by aesthetic impulses often successfully apply to the physical world.
         ⓘThe same criteria that guide good (successful) poetry and music are found in mathematics, such as inevitability, yet unexpectedness: one note or verse follows another, but often with surprising and unexpected outcomes.
      2. That mathematical theories inspired by aesthetic impulses often successfully apply to the physical world is more likely given theism than given naturalism.
         ⓘOn theism, at least Christian theism, we are created in the imagine of a being who is at once omniscient yet creative and aesthetic. But we have no comparable reason to expect us to have such a creative or aesthetic impulse if naturalism is true.
      3. Therefore, the fact that mathematical theories inspired by aesthetic impulses often successfully apply to the physical world is evidence for theism over naturalism.
      • Russell Howell, “Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problems for Naturalism?” Christian Scholar’s Review, 35/4 (2006), pp. 493-504. See also METAPHYSICAL > Applicability of Mathematics

• NOOLOGICALNoological arguments appeal to mind-related phenomena and epistemological considerations as support for theism.

• Consciousness
  • Locke
    1. There has always been something in existence.
    2. Everything is either a thinking thing or an unthinking thing.
    3. There are now thinking things.
    4. Thinking things cannot be arise from unthinking things alone.
       ⓘMind cannot come from matter. That’s almost as bad as getting something from nothing.
    5. Therefore, there has always been at least one thinking thing.
    6. Thinking things cannot arise from other thinking things ad infinitum.
    7. Therefore, all thinking things must arise from at least one thinking thing that has always existed.
    • John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Nice discussion in Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods (Oxford, 2006), pp. 382-385.
  • Moreland
    1. Nonphysical mental states exist.
    2. The explanation for the existence of nonphysical mental states is either scientific or personal.
    3. The explanation for the existence of nonphysical mental states cannot be scientific.
       ⓘAny naturalistic explanation will be one where something material produces something immaterial. But that’s almost as bad as getting something from nothing.
    4. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of nonphysical mental states is personal.
    5. If the explanation for the existence of nonphysical mental states is personal, then it is theistic.
    6. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of nonphysical mental states is theistic.
    • J. P. Moreland,Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge, 2008). A condensed presentation is Moreland, “The Argument from Consciousness,” in Moreland, et al. (eds.), Debating Christian Theism (Oxford, 2013), ch. 9.
  • Page
    1. Consciousness exists.
    2. Given the laws of nature, the existence of consciousness is highly expected if theism is true but highly unexpected if naturalism is true.
       ⓘBecause the complex arrangements of matter needed for consciousness are more likely to arise if theism is true than if naturalism is true.
    3. Therefore, given the laws of nature, the existence of consciousness is strong evidence for theism and against naturalism.
    • Ben Page, “Arguing to Theism from Consciousness,” Faith and Philosophy 37/3 (2020), pp. 336-362.
  • Psychophysical Connections
    • Gratuitous Pleasure
      1. If there are pleasures that are gratuitous given naturalism but expected given theism, they are evidence for theism and against naturalism.
      2. There are pleasures that are gratuitous given naturalism but are expected given theism.
         ⓘYou can still thirst and hunger without the pleasure of eating or drinking. The pleasure of it seems gratuitous. At the very least, the connection between pleasurable mental states and certain physical states seems contingent—it need not have been the case that things essential to survival (eating, drinking, sex) are pleasurable. But they are. This is what we would expect if a benevolent God exists, as He would likely want his creatures to experience pleasure.
      3. Therefore, certain pleasures are evidence for theism and against naturalism.
      • William Paley, Natural Theology (Cambridge, 1803; ed. 2009), pp. 518-519.
        ⓘ“Assuming the necessity of food for the support of animal life; it is requisite, that the animal be provided with organs, fitted for the procuring, receiving, and digesting of its food. It may be also necessary, that the animal be impelled by its sensations to exert its organs. But the pain of hunger would do all this. Why add pleasure to the act of eating; sweetness and relish to food? Why a new and appropriate sense for the perception of the pleasure? Why should the juice of a peach, applied to the palate, affect the part so differently from what it does when rubbed upon the palm of the hand? This is a constitution which, so far as appears to me, can be resolved into nothing but the pure benevolence of the Creator. Eating is necessary; but the pleasure attending it is not necessary: and that this pleasure depends, not only upon our being in possession of the sense of taste, which is different from every other, but upon a particular state of the organ in which it resides, a felicitous adaptation of the organ to the object, will be confessed by any one, who may happen to have experienced that vitiation of taste which frequently occurs in fevers, when every taste is irregular, and every one bad.”
    • Psychophysical Laws
      1. Mental statesE.g., sensations of color, pains, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, etc.
         are connected to brain states by psychophysical laws.
         ⓘMental states are connected to brain states in some law-like way. E.g., when we see and eat a strawberry, we have sensations of redness and sweetness, rather than yellowness and bitterness.
      2. The existence of psychophysical laws is much more probable if theism is true than if naturalism is true.
         ⓘPsycho-physical laws are not generalizable the way physical laws are because the former incorporate fundamentally different kinds of things. So there must be an enormous number of separate laws, and each could state only that some particular brain event is connected to some particular mental event, not why. Theism explains both: God, given that he has good reason to create embodied persons, also has good reason to ensure the relevant connections between persons and their bodies.
      3. Therefore, psychophysical laws are evidence for theism and against naturalism.
      • Robert Adams, “Flavors, Colors, and God,” in Adams, The Virtue of Faith (Oxford, 1987), ch. 16. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 2004), ch. 9. Swinburne, “The Argument from Flavors and Colors,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 293-303.
    • Psychophysical Harmony
      1. Pr(
         PHPH = Psychophysical harmony: States of consciousness are related to each other, and to physical states, in strikingly harmonious ways—ways that seem extremely lucky, or involve many striking apparent coincidences. E.g., being pricked is correlated with feeling pain and not pleasure (though it might have been), resulting in avoiding being pricked (not pricking oneself). Seeing a snake is correlated with believing there is a snake and not a cat (though it might have been), resulting in not petting it.
         |
         TT = Theism, or similar views
         ) >> Pr(PH|
         NN = Naturalism, or similar views
         ).
         ⓘIf naturalism is true, there is no reason to think PH is very likely, since the “overwhelming majority of sets of conceivable psychophysical laws would have produced disharmony,” whereas if theism is true, PH is not at all unlikely, since “God has reason to design the psychophysical laws in order to bring about the values realized by psychophysical harmony,” such as allowing “there to be beings who not only have phenomenal states, but have phenomenal states which can play normatively appropriate roles, who possess meaningful agency, who can respond rationally to sensory evidence, who can behave rationally on the basis of their desires, and who can have reasonably reliable intuitions about their phenomenal states.”
      2. If Pr(PH|T) >> Pr(PH|N), then PH confirms T over N.
      3. Therefore, PH confirms T over N.
      • Brian Cutter and Dustin Crummett, “Psychophysical Harmony: A new Argument for Theism,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming).
    • Free Will
      1. We have
         free willwill In the incompatibilist sense: for at least some of my actions, I could have done otherwise.
         .
      2. If naturalism is true, we cannot have free will.
         ⓘIf naturalism is true, given the laws of nature, it’s hard to see how everything is not just determined by prior states of the universe.
      3. Therefore, naturalism is false.
      4. If theism is true, it is not improbable that we have free will.
         ⓘFirst, God is a free agent, and we are like God in this respect. Second, God holds us morally responsible for our actions and would want us to have genuine loving relationship with him and others, which requires freedom.
      5. Therefore, that we have free will is evidence for theism and against naturalism.
      • C. Stephen Layman, Letters to a Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God (Oxford, 2007), ch. 6. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (SCM, 2009), ch. 3. Moreland, “Theism, Robust Naturalism, and Robust Libertarian Free Will,” in Copan & Taliaferro (eds.), The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality (Lexington Books, 2019), pp. 217-243. I include this argument here because free will is closely associated with a soul or immaterial mind.
    • Knowledge & Proper Function
      1. We have knowledge.
      2. We can have knowledge only if our cognitive faculties function properly.
      3. Our cognitive faculties have a proper function only if they are designed.
      4. Therefore, our cognitive faculties are designed.
      5. If our cognitive faculties are designed, then probably, God exists.
      6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
      • Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford, 1993). Kenny Boyce and Andrew Moon, “In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman,” Synthese 193/9 (2016), pp. 2987-3001. Tyler McNabb, Religious Epistemology (Cambridge, 2018). Justin Barrett, “The Argument from Positive Epistemic Status,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 159-169.
    • Epistemic Probability
      1. The best account of epistemic probability concerns what is permissible for a person with a properly functioning cognitive faculties to believe in the circumstances they’re in.
         ⓘOtte argues for this account against traditional accounts of epistemic probability.
      2. Our cognitive faculties have a proper function only if they are designed.
      3. Therefore, the best account of epistemic probability implies our cognitive faculties are designed.
      4. If our cognitive faculties are designed, then probably, God exists.
      5. Therefore, probably, God exists.
      • Richard Otte, “A Theistic Conception of Probability,” in Beaty (ed.), Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy (Notre Dame, 1990), pp. 92-117.
    • Normative Reasons
      1. Normative reasonsNormative reasons are reasons to do and believe things.
         are favoring relations.
         ⓘ“To judge there is a reason to do or believe something is to judge that there is a favoring of doing or believing it.” Normative reasons appear to be favoring relations, and this is supported by our linguistic practices of referring to normative reasons as commands, directives, etc.
      2. All favoring relations have minds as their bearers.
         ⓘOnly things with minds favor things.
      3. All of the favoring relations constitutive of normative reasons have a single bearer.
         ⓘIt is, among other reasons, simpler to posit one bearer than many.
      4. All of the favoring relations constitutive of normative reasons have a single bearer only if the bearer is the mind of a God-like being.
      5. Therefore, there is a God-like being.
      • Gerald Harrison, Normative Reasons and Theism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
    • Reason
      1. Reason involves intentionality and mental causation.
      2. Intentionality and mental causation can only have a personal explanation.
         ⓘPersonal explanations are in terms of agents and their intentions. Intentionality is characteristic of mind, not material objects. Mental causation involves the propositional content of a thought causing another in a chain of logical inferences, which violates the causal closure of nature.
      3. Therefore, reason can only have a personal explanation.
      4. If reason can only have a personal explanation, the best explanation is theistic.
         ⓘReason in us is best explained by the existence of a primordial mind that’s intentional and causal.
      5. Therefore, the best explanation of reason is theistic.
      • James Ross, “Immaterial Aspects of Thought,” The Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992), pp. 136-150. William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Cornell, 1999). Hasker, “What is Naturalism? And Should We Be Naturalists?” Philosophia Christi 15/1 (2013), pp. 21-34. Victor Reppert, “The Argument from Reason,” in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 6. Stuart Goetz, “The Argument from Reason,” Philosophia Christi 15/1 (2013), pp. 47-62.
    • Intuition
      • Intuitive Knowledge
        1. If naturalism is true, our faculties evolved by unguided natural selection.
        2. If our faculties evolved by unguided natural selection, then there is no connection (either causal, metaphysical, or constituitive) between our intuitions and the corresponding facts.
        3. A connection of this kind is a necessary condition for
           intuitive knowledgeKnowledge, or at least apparently true belief, whose justification does not depend on inference, sensory experience, memory, or testimony.
           .
        4. Consequently, if naturalism is true, then we have no intuitive knowledge.
        5. We have intuitive knowledge.
        6. Therefore, naturalism is not true.
        7. If naturalism is not true, then (probably) God exists.
        • Robert Koons, “The General Argument from Intuition,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 238-257.
      • Intelligibility Intuition
        1. There is no plausible naturalistic aetiology of the
           intelligibility intuitionThe intuition that the world is intelligible, i.e., the states of affairs that obtain in it (at least generally) have explanations for their obtaining.
           , such that we have the intuition because it is true.
           ⓘThe most plausible naturalistic aetiology is evolutionary: II had survival value. But then we don’t have the intelligibility intuition because it’s true. Further, why would the intuition be wholly general, and not about just our local environment? E.g., if I believe all mushrooms are poisonous because the first one I ate was, I wouldn’t believe that because it’s true. If true, it would be by accident.
        2. If (1) is correct, naturalists ought to withhold either the intelligibility intuition, or naturalism.
        3. One should not withhold the intelligibility intuition.
        4. Therefore, naturalists ought to withhold their belief in naturalism.
        5. There are plausible theistic aetiologies of the intelligibility intuition, such that we have the intuition because it is true.
        6. Therefore, the intelligibility intuition is evidence for theism over naturalism.
        • Christophe de Ray, “A New Epistemological Case for Theism,” Religious Studies 58/2 (2022), pp. 379-400.
      • Certainty
        1. We have strongly certain beliefs about—and indeed knowledge of—mathematical objects.
           ⓘNot abstracta per se, or our knowledge of abstracta. E.g., ‘1+1=2.’
        2. If S knows p, there is a causal explanation connecting the knower and the object known.
           ⓘI see and so know, there’s a tree. There’s a causal explanation of my knowledge that involves the tree.
        3. Therefore, there is a causal explanation connecting us and mathematical objects.
           ⓘAbstracta are non-spatiotemporal, so can’t enter into causal relations. Whence our knowledge of them?
        4. Only a God-like being can provide a causal explanation for our strongly certain beliefs about mathematical objects.
           ⓘGod could implant such knowledge in us. This seems to fit well with the phenomenology of strongly certain beliefs, which are luminous and immediate.
        5. Therefore, a God-like being exists.
        • Katherine Rogers, “Evidence for God from Certainty,” Faith and Philosophy 25/1 (2008), pp. 31-46.
      • Knowability
        • Bigelow
          1. For any proposition p, if p then it is possible that someone knows p.
          2. If (1), then for any proposition p, there is someone who knows p.
             ⓘFrederic Fitch famously deduced (2) from (1) in the 60s. Suppose (1) is true but (2) is false. So, for any proposition p, it’s possible someone knows p (i.e., (1)) but there’s some proposition q and no one knows q [i.e., (2) is false]. Now suppose p is ‘q but no one knows q.’ If ‘q but no one knows q’, then it’s possible someone knows ‘q but no one knows q’. [from (1)]. So, it’s possible someone knows ‘q but no one knows q’. (2, 3 MP).
          3. If (2), then there is someone who knows every truth.
             ⓘOne can deduce (3) from (2) the same way (2) is deduced from (1): assume (2) is true but (3) is false…
          4. Therefore, there is someone who knows every truth.
          • John Bigelow, “Omnificence,” Analysis 65/3 (2005), pp. 187-196.
        • Rutten
          1. For any proposition p, if p is possibly true then p is knowable.
          2. The proposition ‘God does not exist’ is not knowable.
             ⓘRutten argues that of the four ways to know a proposition p (p is deductively proven, p is self-evident, p is grounded in indisputable experience, p is based on indisputable testimony), one cannot know ‘God does not exist’ in any of these ways.
          3. Therefore, the proposition ‘God does not exist’ is not possibly true. (4, 5)
          4. Therefore, the proposition ‘God exists’ is necessarily true.
          • Emanuel Rutten, “A Modal-Epistemic Argument for the Existence of God,” Faith and Philosophy, 31/4 (2014), pp. 386–400.
        • Idealism
          1. Every thing has an intrinsic, non-relational quality.
             ⓘOtherwise, there would be nothing in itself. If you can say nothing of a thing except in reference to other things, that’s good reason to think it’s not actually a thing.
          2. Only conscious states have intrinsic, non-relational qualities.
             ⓘPhysics analyses objects in purely dynamic terms; i.e., as nothing over and above their extrinsic, relational properties. E.g., the color, flavor, and odor of a strawberry are not features of it in itself, but features as it relates to experiencers. Remove all such features. What’s left? Particles in relation to other particles, etc. But the particles themselves are dynamic, and so on. By contrast, take qualitative states of consciousness: sweetness or blueness. We do not know such qualities only in terms of their relations to other things, but what they are in themselves.
          3. Therefore, every thing has a conscious quality.
          4. The best explanation of how every thing can have a conscious quality is that everything is (at least partly) constituted by God’s mind.
             ⓘTheism avoids both antirealism and panpsychism.
          5. Therefore, probably, God exists.
          • Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Robert Adams, “Idealism Vindicated,” in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford, 2007), ch. 1. Hugh Hunter, “George Berkeley’s Proof for the Existence of God,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78/2 (2015), pp. 183-193). James Spiegel, “Idealism and the Reasonableness of Theistic Belief,” in Cowan and Spiegel (eds.), Idealism and Christian Philosophy (Bloomsbury, 2016), ch. 1.
        • Anti-Realism
          1. If realism is true but God does not exist, radical skepticism is true.
             ⓘAnti-relists like Rorty & Putnam argue that there’s no way to avoid radical skepticism if there is an objective reality distinct from our minds because it’d always be possible that we’re radically mistaken about it. So they embrace anti-realism: there is no objective, mind-independent reality. But this only follows if theism is false, since God’s mind can constitute for us objective and mind-independent reality, and ensure our knowledge of it. Hence, one can agree that reality is mind-dependent (and so avoid radical skepticism) and be a realist by being a theist.
          2. Radical skepticism is false.
          3. Therefore, either realism is false or God exists. (1, 2)
          4. Realism is true.
          5. Therefore, God exists. (3, 4)
          • Alvin Plantinga, “How to be an Anti-Realist,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 56/1 (1982), pp. 47-70. See also Michael Rea, “Theism and Epistemic Truth-Equivalences,” Nous, 34/2 (2000), pp. 291-301. Michael Dummett, Thought and Reality (Oxford, 2006). W. J. Mander, “On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis between Realism and Anti-Realism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 74/1 (2013), pp. 99-115.
        • Naturalness of Theistic Belief
          1. Pr(
             SDSD = Disposition to form beliefs in God-like supernatural agents
             |
             TT = Theism
             ) >> Pr(SD|
             NN = Naturalism
             ).
          2. If Pr(SD|T) >> Pr(SD|N), then SD confirms T over N.
          3. Therefore, SD confirms T over N.
          • Matthew Braddock, “An Evidential Argument for Theism from Cognitive Science of Religion,” in van Eyghen, et al. (eds.), New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion: The Rationality of Religious Belief (Springer, 2018), pp. 71-98. See also Justin Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (AltaMira Press, 2004). Justin Barrett, Born Believers (Free Press, 2012). Aku Visala and Justin Barrett, “In What Senses Might Religion Be Natural?” in Copan & Taliaferro (eds.), The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality (Lexington Books, 2019), pp. 67-84.
        • Other Minds
          1. If belief in other minds is rational, so is belief in God.
          2. Belief in other minds is rational.
          3. Therefore, belief in God is rational.
          • Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational Justification of Religious Belief (Cornell, 1967).

• LINGUISTICLinguistic arguments appeal to facts about language and semantics as support for theism.

• Berkeley’s Visual Language Argument
  1. Language comes from mind
  2. Visual sensations meet the
     criteria of languageA collection of signs/symbols counts as a language IFF it is (i) arbitrary: there is no necessary association between the symbols and the symbolized; (ii) generative: the symbols can be variously combined to form new meanings; (iii) adaptive: i.e., appropriately responsive.
     .
     ⓘVisual sensations are: (i) arbitrary: there is no necessary connection between visual sensations (i.e., symbols) and tactical experiences (i.e., the symbolized—trees, books, etc.); (ii) generative: visual sensations can variously combine to form meaningful visual messages, just as pixels can variously combine to form different pictures; (iii) adaptive: as conditions change in the world, our visual sensations adjust and remain meaningful.
  3. If visual sensations meet the criteria of language, visual sensations compose a visual language.
  4. Visual sensations compose a visual language.
  5. If visual sensations compose a visual language, it must be the language from the mind of a God-like being.
     ⓘA mind powerful enough to “speak” to us through our visual sensations—i.e. use our very visual sensations as a language—would surely be God-like.
  6. Therefore, there is a God-like being.
  • George Berkeley, Alciphron. Good discussion in Benjamin Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambrdige, 2014), pp. 78-90. Contemporary defense is Todd DeRose, “Semantic Compositionality and Berkeley’s Divine Language Argument,” Religious Studies (forthcoming).

• Concept Acquisition
  1. S can have concepts only if S has the innate ability to acquire concepts and does so with the help of a linguistic community.
     ⓘHow do we acquire concepts? According to innatism, our concepts are innate within us. But how many concepts are there, exactly? And where did they come from? How did they get “in” us innately? Further, we have all sorts of concepts that could not be innate. E.g., ‘computer’. According to abstractionism, we acquire concepts by mental abstraction. But to abstract the concept ‘squareness’, I’d have to attend to the squareness of square things. But attending to an instance of some feature is to already exercise the concept on question (see Peter Geach, Mental Acts). Premise (1) is a via media between innatism and abstractionism. We seem to acquire concepts via language instruction. We can teach a parrot how to say ‘cat.’ But it does not thereby acquire the concept ‘cat’ the way we do.
  2. Those within the linguistic community who help S acquire concepts also acquired concepts from the help of others in a linguistic community.
  3. There cannot be an infinite regress of humans helping other humans acquire concepts.
  4. Therefore, there must be a non-human being with innate concepts outside the linguistic community of humans who initiates the series of humans helping other humans acquire concepts.
  • J. J. C. Smart and J. J. Haldane, Atheism and Theism (Blackwell, 1996).

• Linguistic Ability
  1. Humans innately have very sophisticated linguistic abilities.
     ⓘWork by Stephen Pinker and Paul Bloom suggests: (i) All human societies have language. (ii) They always have. (iii) Language was not invented and did not spread (obviously they don’t mean a particular language was never invented or spread, but that language as a general phenomenon was not invented, etc.). (iv) Contemporary grammars are no more complex than those of hunter-gatherers. (v) Humans are proficient language users regardless of intelligence, social status, or education. (vi) Children are naturally fluent speakers of complex grammatical sentences by age three. (vii) Children are capable of inventing languages that are more systematic than those they hear, and that resemble other languages they’ve never heard.
  2. The best explanation for humans innately having very sophisticated linguistic abilities is that God endowed them with such.
     ⓘJohnson and Potter argue there are insuperable difficulties with naturalistic accounts of language acquisition. But God would want to create persons who can communicate not just with each other but with Him.
  3. Therefore, God probably exists.
  • Jeffrey Johnson and Joyclynn Potter, “The Argument from Language and the Existence of God,” Journal of Religion, 85/1 (2005), pp. 83-93.

• Semantic Content
  1. Radical skepticism is false (we have knowledge).
  2. Radical skepticism is false only if semantic content can serve as an anchor for successful reference (and hence, knowledge).
  3. Semantic content can serve as an anchor for successful reference only if it is (a) independent of finite minds, (b) modally and temporally stable, (c) infinitary, (d) normative, and (e) objective.
     ⓘIn order for me to know, say ‘1+1=2’, the content or meaning of ‘+’ must be: (a) fixed and not relative to finite minds; (b) cannot change over time or from possible world to possible world; (c) the same across infinitely many equations; (d) such that ‘1+1’ ought to be 2; (e) match how objects are, the way the world is.
  4. But semantic content can be (a)-(e) only if it has a transcendent ground.
  5. If semantic content has a transcendent ground, the best candidate is God.
     ⓘGod is not only the perfect candidate for being the transcendent ground of content thus conceived, but could also ensure our epistemic access to it.
  6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
  • Daniel Bonevac, “Arguments from Knowledge, Reference, and Content,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 215-237.

• Semantic Facts
  1. Semantic facts are objective and mind-dependent.
     ⓘWe have the strong intuition that semantic facts are objective, yet mind-dependent. Propositions are objectively true or false, and concepts refer or not. Yet if there were no minds, there would be no semantic facts.
  2. Therefore, the semantic facts underlying context-sensitive language are objective and mind-dependent.
     ⓘOne challenge to the objectivity and mind-dependence of semantic facts is that the meaning of certain counterfactuals, knowledge attributions, and vague terms is context-sensitive. Counterfactuals: If Queen Victoria were alive today, would it be true that she never died or would it instead be true that she is clawing on the inside of her coffin? Knowledge attribution: what degree of evidence is sufficient for knowledge is context-sensitive. Vagueness. There are paradigmatic cases of baldness and not baldness. Where is the line drawn?
  3. The semantic facts underlying context-sensitive language can be objective and mind-dependent only if they’re grounded in a transcendent mind that contains the all the correct semantics of language.
     ⓘTheism allows us to retain this intuition that there can be objective and mind-dependent answers here even if we can’t know or ground them.
  4. Therefore, there is a transcendent mind that contains all the correct semantics of language.
  • Alexander Pruss, “Counterfactuals, Vagueness, and God,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 76-88.

• ANTHROPOLOGICALAnthropological arguments appeal to existential and social facts characteristic of human beings as support for theism.

• Desire
  • Classic
    1. Natural desiresE.g., common, nonpathological desires, such as for food, drink, etc.
       (generally, if not always) imply there is something that can satisfy them.
       ⓘThirst implies there is something that can quench (water), hunger implies there is something that can satiate (food). Etc.
    2. We have a natural desire for things only God can satisfy.
       ⓘE.g., communion with God, reuniting with lost loved ones, unending play and enjoyment, that all injustices would be made right, etc.
    3. Therefore, (probably), there is a God.
    • C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity. Robert Holyer, “The Argument from Desire,” Faith and Philosophy 5/1 (1988), pp. 61-71. Sloan Lee, “As If Swallowing Life Itself: C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Desire II,” in Baggett, et al. (eds.), C. S. Lewis as Philosopher: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty (Liberty, 2017), pp. 327-346. Philip Tallon, “The Theistic Argument from Beauty and Play,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 321-340. For Bayesian presentation and defense, see Slater Simek, “A Bayesian Formulation of C. S. Lewis’ ‘Argument from Desire’,” Sophia 61 (2022), pp. 757-773.
  • Modal
    1. Natural desiresE.g., common, nonpathological desires, such as for food, drink, etc.
       imply there can be something that satisfies them.
    2. We have a natural desire for things only God can satisfy.
       ⓘE.g., objective forgiveness for wrongs we’ve done, communion with God, reuniting with lost loved ones, unending play and enjoyment, that all injustices would be made right, etc.
    3. Therefore, there can be a God.
    4. If there can be a God, there is a God.
       ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See ONTOLOGICAL > The Generic MOA.
    5. Therefore, there is a God.
    • Todd Buras and Michael Cantrell, “C. S. Lewis’s Argument from Nostalgia: A New Argument from Desire,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 304-320.
  • For Life
    1. The desire for life is rational.
    2. The desire for life is rational only if it is
       reflectiveThe desire for life is ‘reflective’ as long as there are have strong reasons to believe that life is worthwhile to the individual who lives it, and it is worthwhile only if the benefits outweigh its costs—being alive is good on the whole.
       .
    3. If naturalism is true, the desire for life cannot be reflective.
    4. Therefore, if naturalism is true, the desire for life is irrational.
       ⓘIf naturalism is true, there are no good reasons to believe our lives are worthwhile (i.e., being alive is good on the whole.). For every instance of good in any given life (happiness, desire- satisfaction, success), there is a corresponding instance of evil (sadness, desire-frustration, failure), and it is practically impossible to show (to oneself or to others) that the former outweigh the latter. Therefore, it appears that the desire for life cannot be a reflective desire, and so irrational.
    5. Therefore, naturalism is false.
    6. If theism is true, the desire for life can be reflective.
       ⓘA perfect being would not have brought human beings into existence, unless their lives were worthwhile. God has the means to ensure that human lives are worthwhile (his resources are not limited by earthly goods).
    7. Therefore, if theism is true, the desire for life can be rational.
    8. Either theism or naturalism is true.
    9. Therefore, theism is true.
    • Christophe de Ray, “Is the Desire for Life Rational?” Religious Studies (forthcoming).
• Meaning
  • Meaning as Endowed
    1. Our lives are objectively meaningful.
    2. Something has meaning IFF it is endowed meaning by one or more personal agents with the requisite authority and control.
    3. Therefore, our lives are endowed meaning by one or more personal agents with the requisite authority and control.
    4. The only personal agent with the requisite authority and control to endow our lives with objective meaning is God.
       ⓘWe have little control over the broad circumstances of our lives: not our birth, most of our relationships, our suffering (broadly speaking), or our deaths. “And if all of this is outside our control, we do not have the requisite control to see to it that our lives are completely meaningful, through and through, from first to last. We can create islands of meaning in this sea of existence we’ve been given, but it is beyond the power of any of us to endow with meaning the entirety of life itself or the entirety of any of our own lives.”
    5. Therefore, God exists.
    • Thomas Morris, Making Sense of it All (Eerdmans, 1992), ch. 4.
  • Meaning as Narrative
    1. Our lives are objectively meaningful.
    2. Our lives can be objectively meaningful only if they form a narrative.
    3. Our lives can form a narrative only if there is a narrator/author of our lives.
    4. Therefore, there is narrator/author of our lives.
    • Joshua Seachris, “The Meaning of Life as Narrative: A New Proposal for Interpreting Philosophy’s ‘Primary’ Question,” Philo 12 (2009), pp. 5-23.
  • Belief in Objective Meaning
    1. Pr(
       BB = Belief that life has objective meaning (i.e., cosmic significance/purpose) is natural to us.
       |
       TT = Theism
       ) >> Pr(B|
       NN = Naturalism
       ).
       ⓘWhy think Pr(B|T) is high? God would want people to have true beliefs about purpose, and to seek, discover, and live out that purpose. Why think Pr(B|N) is low? No reason to think it’s high; that would be surprising. Whatever role that belief might play could be played by something else. What matters is not true or false beliefs, but survival.
    2. If Pr(B|T) >> Pr(B|N), then Pr(T) > Pr(N).
    3. If Pr(T) > Pr(N), then, probably, life has objective meaning.
    4. Therefore, probably, life has objective meaning (1-3, MP, HS)
    5. If life has objective meaning, probably, God exists.
    6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
    • Trent Dougherty, “Belief that Life has Meaning Confirms that Life has Meaning: A Bayesian Approach,” in Seachris and Goetz (eds.), God and Meaning: New Essays (Bloomsbury, 2016), ch. 4.
  • Motivation
    1. If x is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives, that is evidence that x can exist.
    2. God is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives.
    3. Therefore, that is evidence that God can exist.
    4. Evidence that God can exist is evidence that God does exist.
       ⓘBecause if God possibly exists, God exists. See ONTOLOGICAL > The Generic MOA.
    5. Therefore, that God is the motivational center of many peoples’ lives is evidence that God exists.
    • Alexander Pruss, “The Ontological Argument and the Motivational Centers of Lives,” Religious Studies 46/2 (2010), pp. 233-249.
  • Love
    1. Our richest and most profound displays of love strongly suggest that they are not just evolutionary byproducts of kin selection or reciprocal altruism.
    2. If (1), we’re justified in thinking they’re not just evolutionary byproducts of kin selection or reciprocal altruism.
    3. If we’re justified in thinking our richest and most profound displays of love are not just evolutionary byproducts of kin selection or reciprocal altruism, then we’re justified in thinking there is a deeper, non-naturalistic source of love central to reality.
    4. We’re justified in thinking there is a deeper, non-naturalistic source of love central to reality.
    5. If (4), God is the best explanation of that.
    6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
    • Jerry Walls, “The God of Love and the Meaning of Life,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 304-320.
  • Happiness
    1. What makes life worth living is
       happinessHappiness understood as the experience of intrinsic goods that satisfy one’s deepest desires and constitutes one’s wellbeing.
       .
    2. If what makes life worth living is happiness, it is rational to forego happiness in this life for the sake of moral duty only if there’s an afterlife where happiness and morality perfectly align.
    3. It is rational to forego happiness in this life for the sake of moral duty.
    4. Therefore, there’s an afterlife where happiness and morality perfectly align.
    5. If there’s an afterlife where happiness and morality perfectly align, then probably, God exists.
    6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
    • Stewart Goetz, The Purpose of Life (Continuum, 2012). See also MORAL > The Practical and Rational Demands of Morality > Kant, Layman
  • Gratitude
    1. Prepositional gratitudePrepositional gratitude occurs when one agent, the beneficiary, is grateful for some benefit to another agent, the benefactor.
       is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.
    2. Prepositional gratitude is the paradigmatic variety of gratitude.
    3. Therefore, the paradigmatic variety of gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.
    4. If the paradigmatic variety of gratitude is overall fitting only when targeted towards agents, then all varieties of gratitude are overall fitting only when targeted towards agents.
       ⓘHunt defends this as implied by the principle, which he also defends, that paradigmatic emotions set the fittingness conditions for their non-paradigmatic varieties.
    5. Therefore, all varieties of gratitude are only overall fitting when targeted towards agents.
    6. We often fittingly feel gratitude for things that can only be a benefit from a God-like benefactor.
       ⓘE.g., sunsets.
    7. We often fittingly feel gratitude for things that can only be a benefit from a God-like benefactor only if a God-like agent exists.
    8. Therefore, a God-like agent exists.
    • Marcus Hunt, “Gratitude is Only Fittingly Targeted Toward Agents,” Sophia 61 (2022), pp. 345-363.
  • Human Nature
    1. Humans have a
       dual moral natureone and the same human can sometimes be morally good, and other times be morally wicked.
       .
    2. The best explanation for why humans have a dual moral nature is the Judeo-Christian one.
       ⓘI.e., humans were created in the image of a good God but corrupted themselves by freely sinning. “Man’s greatness and wretchedness are so evident that the true religion must necessarily teach us that there is in man some great principle of greatness and some great principle of wretchedness.” (Pascal)
    3. Therefore, its reasonable to believe in the Judeo-Christian explanation for why humans have a dual moral nature.
    4. The Judeo-Christian explanation for why humans have a dual moral nature implies God exists.
    5. Therefore, it’s reasonable to believe God exists.
    • Pascal, Pensées. Douglas Groothuis, “Disposed Royalty: Pascal’s Anthropological Argument,” Journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society 41/2 (1998), pp. 297-313. Robert Velarde, “Greatness and Wretchedness: The Usefulness of Pascal’s Anthropological Argument in Apologetics,” Christian Research Journal 27/2 (2004). Jonathan Threlfall, “The Imago Dei and Blaise Pascal’s Abductive Anthropological Argument,” Philosophia Christi 20/2 (2018), pp. 379-400.
  • Political Authority
    1. Political authority is justified.
       ⓘI.e., anarchism is false.
    2. If the justification of political authority is derived from a mundane source, it is probably either contractarian or consequentialist.
    3. But neither contractarian theories nor consequentialist theories provide adequate justification for political authority.
       ⓘNeill and McNabb argue that contractarian theories are too authoritative, and consequentialist theories are not authoritative enough.
    4. Therefore, the justification of political authority is probably not derived from a mundane source.
    5. If the justification of political authority is probably not derived from a mundane source, it’s probably derived from God.
       ⓘGod delegates to mundane rulers the authority he has over us in virtue of being our morally perfect creator, and that authority remains legitimate insofar as it reflects God’s moral nature and the ideal of Shalom. God, therefore, is the best explanation of how just that amount of political authority requisite for the common good is justified.
    6. Therefore, probably, God exists.
    • Jeremy Neill and Tyler McNabb, “By Whose Authority? A Political Argument for God’s Existence,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11/2 (2019), pp. 163-189. See also McNabb, God and Political Theory (Cambridge, 2022), ch. 1.
  • Agreement with Others
    • Consensus Gentium
      • Classic
        1. If there is widespread belief in God, that is prima facie evidence that God exists.
           ⓘBasic insights in epistemology, such as the evidential value of testimony, imply widespread belief is evidence for the truth of that belief. Thomas Kelly argues it’s undeniable that we commonly and properly treat the beliefs of others as evidence of the truth of those beliefs. Zagzebski explains why: the reasons we have for trusting ourselves to form true beliefs are reasons for likewise trusting others to. Further, one’s credence in a belief increases the more widespread it is.
        2. There is widespread belief in God.
           ⓘHow widespread? “Phil Zuckerman (a sociologist of religion and an atheist, one of whose avowed purposes is to show that non-belief is more common than is typically claims) estimates that approximately 88 percent of the world’s population believes in God.” (Thomas Kelly)
        3. Therefore, widespread belief in God is prima facie evidence that God exists.
        • Loren Meierding, “The Consensus Gentium Argument,” Faith and Philosophy 15/3 (1998), pp. 271-297. Linda Zagzebski, “Epistemic Self-Trust and the Consensus Gentium Argument,” in Clark & VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief (Oxford, 2011), pp. 22-36. Thomas Kelly, Consensus Gentium: Reflections on the ‘Common Consent’ Argument for the Existence of God,” in Clark & VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief (Oxford, 2011), pp. 135-156. Excellent discussion of the argument is Jonathan Matheson, “The Argument from Common Consent,” in Ruloff and Horban (eds.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury, 2021), pp. 293-309.
      • Réhault
        1. Theism has been the majority view throughout human history.
        2. Atheism is the denial of theism.
        3. A false belief is essentially the product of a cognitive malfunction of some sort.
        4. It is more probable that a cognitive malfunction occurs a small number of times in a few people than a great many times in many different people.
           ⓘSuppose you are in a mathematics class: all the students but you get the same answer to a particular problem. What is the chance that you are the only one to get it right? For the majority to get it wrong, the same cognitive malfunction producing the same result must have occurred many times in different minds. For one person to be wrong, a cognitive malfunction needs only have occurred once. But the latter is generally more likely. Therefore in a case of peer disagreement, it is generally more likely that the majority is right than the lonely dissenter. In such a case, the number becomes evidence for the truth of the proposition that the majority believes.”
        5. Therefore, theism prima facie more likely to be true than atheism.
        • Sebastein Réhault, “Can Atheism Be Epistemically Responsible When So Many People Believe in God?” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7/1 (2015), pp. 181-198.
    • Epistemic Authorities
      1. If many of those whom I regard as epistemic authorities on p believe p, that is prima facie reason for me to believe p.
      2. Many of those whom I regard as epistemic authorities on God’s existence believe God exists.
      3. Therefore, I have prima facie reason to believe God exists.
      • Mark Dobrzeniecki, “Is the Fact that Other People Believe in God a Reason to Believe? Remarks on the Consensus Gentium Argument,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 10/3 (2013), pp. 133-153.
    • Exceptional Philosophers
      1. If a substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time have believed p, that is evidence for p.
         ⓘBecause agreement and consensus is so rare in philosophy, when philosophers “reach a consensus or form a majority or supermajority opinion on a certain topic, we gain reasons (pro tanto and defeasible) for thinking that their opinion on such a topic is epistemically justified and/or true.” More carefully, Migel argues that if (a) the most important philosophers of the past (or a majority of them) held views about p that were the same or close approximations to mine, and (b) the conclusions reached by those exceptional philosophers regarding p have not been shown to be implausible among those specializing today on p and related questions, then that is evidence for p.
      2. A substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time have believed God exists.
      3. Therefore, the fact that a substantial majority of the most important philosophers of all time have believed God exists is evidence that God exists.
      • Felipe Migel, “The Epistemic Significance of Agreement with Exceptional Theistic Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 37/4 (2020), pp. 451-474.

• METAMeta-arguments appeal to metaphilosophical considerations about arguments and theories in support of theism.

• Transcendental
  • Anderson
    1. Possibly there is human thought.
    2. Therefore, necessarily, possibly there is human thought. (1, S5)
    3. Necessarily, if possibly there is human thought, then God exists.
       ⓘThe transcendental premise: It’s not just that God’s existence is a necessary condition of human thought; God’s existence is a necessary condition of the possibility of human thought. “Had there been no human thought in actuality, God would still have had to exist, for his existence is a necessary condition of the mere possibility of human thought.” (Anderson)
    4. Therefore, if necessarily, possibly there is human thought, then necessarily, God exists. (3, K)
    5. Therefore, necessarily, God exists. (2, 4)
    • James Anderson, “No Dilemma for the Proponent of the Transcendental Argument,” Philosophia Christi 13/1 (2011), pp. 189-198. One of the better essays on TAGs, which has influenced subsequent formulations (such as Anderson’s above), is Sean Choi, “The Transcendental Argument,” in Geisler and Meister (eds.), Reasons for Faith (Crossway, 2007), pp. 231-247. It is unclear to me whether transcendental arguments would not be better categorized as NOOLOGICAL, alongside the argument from reason, or METAPHYSICAL, alongside arguments from propositions.
  • Békefi
    1. If the negation of ‘God exists’ is
       performatively self-stultifyingA proposition is performatively self-falsifying if its affirmation implies its falsehood
       , then ‘God exists’ is true.
    2. The negation of ‘God exits’ is performatively self-stultifying.
    3. Therefore, God exists.
    • Bálint Békefi, “Van Til versus Stroud: Is the Transcendental Argument for Christian Theism Viable?” TheoLogica 2/1 (2018), pp. 136-160. Békefi is critical of the argument, but his outline seems to accurately capture what a TAG, if defensible, would look like. For a handful of arguments that seem to fit this profile, see Joshua Rasmussen, “Does Atheism Entail a Contradiction?” Manuscrito 44/4 (2021), pp. 31-48.
  • Evidential Ambiguity
    1. Pr(
       EE = The evidence for the existence of God is ambiguous, or at least not rationally coercive.
       |
       TT = Theism
       ) > Pr(E|
       NN = Naturalism
       ).
       ⓘPresumably if God exists, God would want a genuine, loving relationship with His rational creatures. This means God would not want the evidence for His existence to be rationally coercive. It is better that people freely come to believe in Him. On the other hand, if naturalism is true, there is no reason to expect the evidence for God’s existence to be ambiguous. We might even expect the opposite: if naturalism were true, it should be more obvious that God does not exist, or it would be easier to dismiss, with obviously correct explanations, all the evidence for God’s existence.
    2. If Pr(E|T) > Pr(PH|N), then E confirms T over N.
    3. Therefore, E confirms T over N.
    • Suggested in C. A. McIntosh, “Recent Work on Theistic Arguments I” Philosophy Compass 17/7 (2022), pp. 1-12. For defense of the claim that we should expect, if theism were true, the evidence for theism to be ambiguous, see Paul Moser, “Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiding,” in Howard-Snyder and Moser (eds.), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 120-148 and more fully in his books The Elusive God (Cambridge, 2008) and The Evidence for God (Cambridge, 2010).
  • Cumulative Credence Raiser
    1. The more independent arguments there are that p is true, the higher one’s credence should be that p is possibly true.
       ⓘObviously arguments which aren’t invalid, demonstrably unsound, etc.
    2. There are more than enough arguments for the conclusion ‘God exists’ to justify belief that God possibly exists.
    3. If we’re justified in believing God possibly exists, we’re justified in believing God exists.
    4. Therefore, we’re justified in believing God exists.
    • Benjamin Arbour, “Dogmatic Open-Mindedness and Open-Minded Dogmatics,” in Trickett and Gilhooly (eds.), Open-Mindedness in Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge Scholars, 2019), ch. 5.
  • Pruss & Rasmussen’s Confidence that At Least One of their Arguments is Sound
    A1
    1. The disjunction of the conjunctions of the premises of some subset S of deductive arguments for a necessary being is true.
       ⓘPruss and Rasmussen have in mind just the deductive arguments for a necessary being in their book, Necessary Existence. But we can pick any subset of deductive arguments for a necessary being that we think help make (1) probable.
    2. All the arguments in S are valid.
    3. Therefore, there is a necessary being.

    A2
    1. There is at least one person smart enough to be able to rework one of the many arguments for a necessary being into a sound argument.
    2. No one can do the impossible.
    3. Necessarily, the conclusion of a sound argument is true.
    4. Therefore, it is possible for there to be a sound argument for the existence of a necessary being.
    5. It is possible that a necessary being exists.
    6. Therefore, there is a necessary being.
    • Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen, Necessary Existence (Oxford, 2018), p. 195, 207. I assume Pruss and Rasmussen are being slightly tongue-in-cheek with these.
  • Cumulative Case

    Calculator

    Royal’s Case

    	No. of ArgumentsArguments that are probabilistically independent of each other.	LREstimated Likelihood Ratio representing the evidential strength of theistic argument(s), from very weak (1.01) to strong (8).	Royal’s Case illustrates a commonly accepted standard for strong evidence. If you blindly draw from one of two urns, one with all white balls, the other 1/2 black, 1/2 white (perfectly mixed), and draw three white balls in a row, that is strong evidence that you’re drawing from the all-white urn. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) in this case is (1/.5)³ = 2³ = 8.
    StrongPremise(s) much more plausible than not. LR: 3.1-8
    DecentPremise(s) safely more plausible than not. LR: 1.5-3
    WeakPremise(s) not much more plausible than not. LR: 1.01-1.4
    Total LRCombined LRs of all theistic arguments.
    Equiv. White BallsThe number of white balls drawn in a row (Royal’s Case) equivalent to Total LR. If theism is the urn with all white balls, this gives a sense of how much the arguments (white balls) confirm theism. Three or more is strong confirmation.
    Starting Pr(God exists)A decimal between 0-1 representing how likely is God’s existence before theistic arguments are considered. As likely as not (= .5)? Low because of evidence against (e.g., evil)?
    Final Pr(God exists)The probability of God’s existence after theistic arguments are considered.

    • The math behind the calculator is laid out in Ted Poston, “The Argument from So Many Arguments,” in Walls and Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford, 2018), pp. 372-386. On the intrinsic probability of theism, see Calum Miller, “The Intrinsic Probability of Theism,” Philosophy Compass 13/10 (2018). Ted Poston, “The Intrinsic Probability of Grand Explanatory Theories,” Faith and Philosophy 37/4 (2020), pp. 401-420.